

A GOLDEN GOAL FOR SOUTH AFRICA

Security arrangements for the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup

Johan Burger, Institute for Security Studies
jburger@issafrica.org

The 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup has been a major talking point both locally and internationally, and many concerns have been raised over South Africa's ability to host such a major event. These concerns essentially relate to infrastructural capacity and security. It goes without saying that South Africa is obliged to provide high level security for participating teams and management as well as for the thousands of spectators who are expected to flood South Africa for the duration of the event. This article takes a look at other high level events that have been hosted in South Africa so as to get an idea of what is required and examines planned security arrangements for the 2010 World Cup.

The FIFA Soccer World Cup in 2010¹ will be a month-long event taking place in June/July of that year and will be decided by 64 matches played in ten stadiums spread over nine South African cities. During this time approximately 450,000 visitors are expected to visit this country, while 3.3 million tickets will be sold for these matches. South Africa, as the host country, is obligated to ensure a high level of security for this event, which includes the security of the teams, the spectators, and their property, for the duration of the event. At the same time 'normal' policing, i.e. policing the public of South Africa, cannot be neglected.

Media reports have questioned South Africa's readiness to present an event of this magnitude. In addition to concerns about infrastructure and transport, the high levels of serious and violent crimes in particular have raised doubts about the ability of the police to provide the required levels of security. In the discussion that follows, attention will be given to the 2010 crime and security situation, as

well as to the development potential of this event for the South African police and for policing in general.

Crime overview

The crime situation in South Africa is serious and dominates the domestic agendas of both government and civil society as well as daily media reports. There are also legitimate concerns that levels of violence associated with crime in this country are on the increase. The result is increased fear of crime, and growing distrust in the police and government in general to effectively deal with crime. For example, in a victim survey done by the Institute for Security Studies in 2003, 58% of respondents indicated that they are afraid of walking alone in their area after dark, compared to 25% in a 1998 survey.

Table 1 provides a summary of the serious and violent crimes that are our biggest cause for concern. In an attempt to determine possible trends, a comparison is provided for three financial years since 1994/95. Unfortunately, the figures for car

hijackings are available only from 2001/02 (Table 2), as is the case with cash-in-transit robberies. In the latter case the actual figures are given because, although still serious, the numbers are too small to determine a meaningful ratio per 100,000 of the population.

*Table 1: Comparative figures for serious and violent crimes²
(rate per 100,000 of the population)*

	1994/95	1999/2000	2005/06
Murder	66,9	52,5	39,5
Attempted murder	69,1	65,4	43,9
Rape	115,3	122,8	117,1
Robbery (aggravated)	218,5	229,5	255,3
Robbery (common)	84,2	173,5	159,4

Table 2: Car hijackings and cash-in-transit robberies

	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06
Hijackings (rate per 100,000)	35,4	32,3	29,7	26,7	27,4
Cash-in-transit robberies (number of incidents)	238	374	192	220	383

According to the Annual Report of the South African Police Service 2005/06 there are promising signs over the last five years that crime is on the decrease. Between 2004/05 and 2005/06 the listed serious and violent crimes decreased as follows:

- Murder: 2,0%
- Attempted murder: 16,6%
- Rape: 1%
- Robbery with aggravated circumstances: 6,2%
- Common robbery (an element of violence, but without the use of weapons): 18,3%.

Car hijackings, on the other hand, which decreased by 10,1% in the previous financial year, increased

by 2,6% in the last financial year (2005/06). Cash-in-transit robberies increased by 74,1% and robberies at shopping malls (not shown in the tables) by 32%.

These decreases are indeed promising, but it must be kept in mind that they are decreases from extremely high levels and that it will take a long time before these crimes reach the sort of levels that will positively impact on public feelings of safety. The murder rate, for example, decreased from 66,9 per 100,000 in 1994/95 to 39,5 in 2005/06, but is still almost eight times the world average of 5,5 and 20 times higher than the British rate of just under two per 100,000. In other words, if the current reduction rate in murder is maintained, it will take approximately another 15 years to reach the international norm. The South African figure becomes even more disturbing if one looks at the real number of 18,528 people who were murdered in one year, i.e. 50 murders per day.

Rape has remained at the same high level over the last 11 years and shows no sign of decreasing to the extent that some of the other serious crimes have done. In real terms, the figure of 117,1 per 100,000 in 2005/06 represents almost 55,000 rapes, i.e. 150 women raped every day in this country. This is an alarming situation; especially in view of the result of independent research that shows that between 33–66% of rape cases are never reported to the police. Rape is also not an easy crime to police and happens mostly indoors in areas outside the normal reach of police activities. Recent research has shown that in 75% of rape incidents the victim and perpetrator are known to one another.

However, it is robbery, and the violence that goes with it, that has the biggest psychological impact on the ordinary person. Whether it is robbery at one's home, a hijacking, or robbery at places of entertainment (e.g. shopping malls, restaurants, etc), the indisputable fact is that people are afraid of being robbed. If this situation is allowed to continue and, even worse, allowed to further deteriorate, it will create a psychosis of fear which, in turn, could lead to irrational and even unlawful behaviour by certain individuals and groups.

Unlike murder and attempted murder, robbery (both aggravated and common) displays a different trend. Whereas murder consistently decreased since 1994/95 (by approximately 40% over the last 11 years), robbery with aggravating circumstances increased from 218,5 per 100,000 in 1994/95, to 288,1 in 2003/04; before decreasing again to 255,3. This last figure is still 17% higher than in 1994/95. Common robbery increased rapidly from 84,2 per 100,000 in 1994/95, to 223,4 in 2003/04, before decreasing to 159,4 in 2005/06. This means that in spite of decreases over the last three years, common robbery is now 90% higher than 11 years ago.

It is fairly certain that robbery (and non-violent crimes such as theft) will be the biggest crime threat to visitors and spectators during the 2010 Soccer World Cup. When considering the ability of the police to safeguard the 2010 event, it may therefore be useful to briefly compare this event with previous major events held in South Africa, with a specific focus on the 2003 ICC Cricket World Cup.

Previous 'big' events in South Africa

Since the advent of democracy South Africa has hosted a number of major events, notably the 1995 IRB Rugby World Cup, the 1999 All Africa Games, the 2003 ICC Cricket World Cup and a number of international conferences such as the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) and the World Conference on Racism (WCR). During this time the police developed effective security concepts to underpin their entire big event planning, and which have proven to be very successful. No serious incidents occurred at any of these events. According to SAPS Deputy National Commissioner André Pruis, these concepts were recognised by the United Nations (UN) after the WSSD and adopted for all future UN events.

A quick comparison between the 2010 Soccer World Cup (SWC) and the 2003 Cricket World Cup (CWC) will give an indication of the size of this type of security operation. Whereas the SWC will be a month-long event with 64 matches, the CWC lasted 44 days, with 33 matches. CWC matches were played in seven provinces, while SWC

matches will be played in all nine provinces. The security budget for the CWC was approximately R91m, against FIFA's safety and security budget estimate of approximately \$36m (more than R250m) for 2010.

The combined force deployed for the CWC totalled approximately 4,600 members of the South African Police Service, South African National Defence Force, Metropolitan Police Services, various emergency services and private security companies. Given that the duration of the event should not have a substantial influence on the number of police/security personnel deployed, the total number of personnel for the SWC will probably be determined more by factors such as the larger number of matches, the fact that matches will be played in all nine provinces, and that much larger crowds of supporters and spectators are expected at the soccer matches. A rough estimate at this stage places the number of police/security personnel at double that of the CWC, i.e. approximately 10,000.

To the credit of the South African Police Service, which led the security operation during 2003, no serious incidents occurred during the entire event. In fact, after the CWC a leading London financial newspaper remarked that an amazing thing happened during the Cricket World Cup in South Africa: "Nothing went wrong". This is despite the fact that crime rates were generally higher in 2003/04 than at any time before or since, even for robbery. So why is there such widespread concern that South Africa may not be able to provide adequate security for the Soccer World Cup?

The security operation for 2010

At an ISS seminar, 'Securing the 2010 Soccer World Cup: Are we ready?', in September 2006, the SAPS was given the opportunity to allay fears that crime may derail the World Cup and that South Africa will not be ready to safeguard this event. Assistant Commissioner Mathongwane, on behalf of the police, gave an overview of the security plan for this event, but was careful to avoid detail that may compromise operational security.

Based on Commissioner Mathongwane's presentation and the FIFA report of 4 May 2004, the

security operation is understood to be built around the following key areas:

- An integrated operational coordinating mechanism. The utilisation of such a mechanism (or organisational structure) to plan and execute the security operation is crucial. In this instance the police are once again the lead agent in the so-called JOINTS (Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure) that reports to and is directed by the JCPS cluster (Justice, Crime Prevention and Security) at both Cabinet and Directors-General level. The JOINTS created an operational planning committee, chaired by a divisional commissioner, and a priority committee, chaired by an assistant commissioner, for the operational work. All the various role-players, including relevant government departments such as Sport and Recreation and Environmental Affairs and Tourism, as well as SAFA (South African Football Association) and FIFA, are represented on the planning and priority committees.
- An integrated security strategy. This strategy details the security for the stadiums, practice venues, public viewing areas, media centres, main hotels, public transport, air- and seaports, main routes and popular tourist attractions. The strategy also provides for an integrated intelligence capability, information technology security, and control of undesirable persons (e.g. soccer hooligans or 'risk supporters'), public order, food security, dedicated courts, contingency plans and disaster management. In 2004 the FIFA Inspection Group, while concerned about the crime problem, expressed their satisfaction with this approach.
- Adequate numbers. The SAPS has ensured that by 2010 (and in addition to other police and security services), it will have sufficient member numbers to both safeguard the event and to provide 'normal' policing services. In 2001 the police numbered approximately 121,000 and in 2006 that figure increased to 156,000. According to the Annual Report of the South African Police Service 2005/06 the personnel target for 2008/09 is 179,000.
- A thorough vetting and accreditation process. Security companies, for example, will have to be accredited before being contracted.
- Training. Members of the various security services, including police reservists who will be utilised during the event, will receive special training and orientation.
- Practice. Other big events between now and 2010 will be used to test the above approach and to make changes where necessary. An example of such a big event is South Africa's general election in 2009.
- Good media communication. Structures to ensure good media and public communication will be in place well ahead of the event. Apart from keeping the media informed about security issues, these structures will also be responsible for security 'tips' to the public (during the 2003 CWC these 'tips' were also published in the Tournament Guide).
- Lessons learnt. Over the years the police have sent representatives to attend a number of big events abroad and to study their security arrangements. For example, police members attended the last three Olympic Games and other big sporting events such as the 2006 FIFA Soccer World Cup in Germany. From all these events and local experience they were able to develop the security concepts that seem to be very effective locally and also impressed the United Nations security representatives. According to Commissioner Mathongwane the following practices, applied by the Germans during the 2006 World Cup, were of particular interest:
 - The use of 'Fan Fests'. These were stadiums not used for any of the matches and where the organisers provided facilities to show matches on big screens. People who did not have or could not afford tickets had free access to these stadiums. However, the same level of security that applied at the official venues also applied at the Fan Fests.
 - The ticketing system. Tickets were not only electronically monitored, but also personalised. This had a number of advantages, such as

keeping the authorities informed of the number of spectators and also who they were. In addition it prevented sales of tickets on the black market.

- The integrated security plan. Some aspects of the German security plan were very useful for purposes of finalising South Africa's integrated security strategy.

Policing and security

The current crime situation in South Africa is certainly a huge area of concern and perhaps also a source of embarrassment for the South African government. This is especially the case in view of the fast approaching Soccer World Cup in 2010 and our struggle to get the crime situation under control. It is feared that the ongoing high levels of crime and violence may deter many people from coming to South Africa and even, according to some speculation, that the event itself may be moved elsewhere. Against this background, government over the last few months announced a number of new 'plans' to curb crime.

At a press conference on 1 August 2006, Charles Nqakula, Minister of Safety and Security, provided details of the crime combating strategy adopted by Cabinet at their *Iekgotla* the week before. This strategy is nothing really new, but does contain some additions to the existing National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS) which was adopted in 2000 and which boasted a number of operational successes. According to the Minister his office would approach the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation to do a study on the violent nature of crime in South Africa. This is a welcome admission that a better understanding of this phenomenon is needed in order to deal with it more effectively.

The Minister also made it clear that much more emphasis will be placed on eradicating organised crime. For this purpose special teams will be established to deal with crime syndicates while other teams will be formed to search for and arrest suspects for whom warrants of arrest are outstanding. Intelligence units will assist these teams and will receive additional funding and human resources. In view of indications of the

increasing involvement of foreigners in crime in South Africa, the Minister announced stricter border control measures. For this purpose a national border control and security strategy had been finalised and a national border control centre set up. Finally, the Minister announced closer cooperation with Business Against Crime and the mobilisation of communities, through religious groupings and others, to become more actively involved in the fight against crime.

However, the large scale restructuring that the SAPS has embarked upon remains a source of concern. Although the intentions of this exercise are not being questioned, its practicability is in doubt. The intentions are, among others, to move police officials at various administrative offices to police stations to numerically strengthen these stations and to increase police visibility; to decentralise specialised units to the so-called accounting (or 'super') stations where they will be more accessible to communities; and to transfer high ranking officers such as directors and assistant commissioners to 'problem' stations as station commissioners and to other key posts.

From discussions with members of the police it is evident that there is growing dissatisfaction with the rationale behind the restructuring process. Police officials are generally confused with the reasoning behind the process and with the way in which it is being communicated and implemented. It is to be expected that this type of dissatisfaction and uncertainty must have a negative impact on morale. As a consequence the following questions or concerns about the restructuring process are raised:

- Is it wise to undertake such a comprehensive restructuring so close to the biggest major event this country has ever seen and amidst an increasing violent crime situation? Would it not be more realistic to phase it in more gradually and over a much longer period?
- Is it a fair assumption by police management that senior officers, who in many cases obtained their senior rank due to fast track promotions to enhance transformation, will improve the management of problematic police stations?
- Instead of decentralising the specialised units and running the risk of these members eventually

losing their skills or leaving the police (and losing their skills anyway), why not rather consider strengthening them and enabling them, firstly, to retain and continue developing expertise, and secondly, from a position of strength and expertise, to assist and train members at police station level?

- The police/public ratio of 1:385 compares favourably with the international average of 1:300–400 and, as indicated above, is set to improve even more over the next three years. It appears as if the problem is not so much with the number of police, but rather with how they are being managed. This notion is supported by the recent announcement of the Minister of Safety and Security that retired police officers will be approached to assist the police in terms of their experience and skills. At the same time it is an acknowledgement that the police lost more expertise than they could afford. There seems to be an almost desperate search for alternative ways to compensate for earlier mistakes, but without admitting that these were made.

Conclusion

There are legitimate concerns that South Africa may not be able to provide an adequate level of security for the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup. These concerns are based primarily on two premises:

- Firstly, there is general consensus that the high levels of crime and especially the extreme nature of the violence that accompanies these crimes, create a negative perception about South Africa's readiness to host this event. There is a danger that this may deter people from coming here and some even speculate that the event may be moved to another country.
- Secondly, the perceived struggle within the police to stem the crime tide and the apparent clumsiness with which they are attempting to restructure the organisation to make it more efficient and effective, leads to serious distrust in the ability of the police to safeguard the 2010 event.

As regards the first premise, there is an obvious need for more visible commitment and an expression of political will by government to address the crime problem. This should include a

more holistic and inclusive approach to crime, both in terms of its manifestation and its economic and socio-political roots. Commitment would also include the setting up of an extra-cabinet ministerial committee to manage such an inclusive approach.

With regard to the second premise, some form of political intervention is necessary to ensure that the restructuring of the police is done sensibly and responsibly. The police have in the past proved themselves as competent and able to secure major events. This was the case, for example, in 2003 with the Cricket World Cup, despite the fact that in general levels of crime were higher then than they are at the moment. Therefore the current restructuring process should not be allowed in any way to impair the ability of the police to perform according to their proven ability.

Acknowledgement

This article is based on J Burger, The 2010 FIFA World Cup: A Development Opportunity for South Africa, in *Discourse* 34 (2), Dec 2006, pp 40-46.

Endnotes

- 1 Most of the information for this article can be found on the Internet at, for example: <http://www.southafrica.info/2010/fifareportsa.htm>
- 2 These figures were taken from the *Annual Reports of the South African Police Service* 2001/02 – 2005/06.