Decentralisation in Africa: A Critical Review of Uganda's Experience

Since the rise to power of the Movement government under the leadership of Yoweri Museveni in 1986, Uganda has largely been show-cased as an emerging democracy on the continent. Among other things, Museveni's regime has been acclaimed for the restoration of periodic national elections, the making of the Constitution and the overall promotion of democratic governance, most especially through the adoption of a decentralized system with a commendable institutional and legal framework. Decentralization is believed to promote service delivery at the local level, accountability for government resources by local leaders, and the involvement of the masses in local planning and the implementation of government programmes. It is now over twenty years since decentralization was adopted as a system of government but the quality of service delivery and the accountability for government resources at the local level remains just as deplorable as the extent to which the masses are involved in the planning and implementation of government programmes in their localities. This paper examines the challenges that inhibit the realization of the noble objectives of decentralization, notwithstanding the apparently impressive institutional and legal framework.


Introduction
Uganda's experience with decentralisation is as highly acclaimed as it is criticised.
Though regarded by some commentators as one of the most ambitious forms of devolution of power among the developing countries, it is also greatly criticised for its failure to deliver on its promises. According to Steiner, the scale and scope of the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the local level in Uganda's decentralisation reform is exceptional among developing countries. 1 On their part, James and Francis have described it as "one of the most far-reaching local government reform programmes in the developing world." 2 Mitchinson, in the same vein, contends that Uganda's decentralisation programme "is one of the most radical devolution initiatives of any country at this time." 3 But the quest for the fruits of decentralisation appears to be only increasing. As Tumushabe et al have lamentably observed: 4 Almost two decades later, the quality of public service delivery is less than desirable; district local governments with no financial resources of their own have become mere agents of the centre while the accountability mechanisms for good governance and public service delivery are either non-existent or malfunctional.
Other commentators view Uganda's decentralisation programme as more of a political gimmick than a genuine effort to promote democracy and good governance: 5 …the creation of the districts did not follow any established parameters, neither was the process informed by administrative necessity or economic rationale. Instead the president announced their creation via presidential decrees, often to reward politicians threatening to withdraw support for the NRM, or punish those who had.
The principal objectives of decentralisation have historically included the promotion of accountability, transparency, efficiency in governance and service delivery, and the empowerment of the masses from grass-root levels through the promotion of the participation of individuals and communities in their governance. Decentralisation is therefore generally viewed as an effective mechanism of extending and deepening the democratisation process to the grass-roots in order to promote people's-based development in the context of a high regard for human rights.
Uganda's scenario presents a near-perfect fundamental contradiction between form and content. The great promise of improved accountability, efficiency in governance and the empowerment of the masses remains elusive in the country, notwithstanding the apparent commitment to the implementation of the decentralisation programme, at least at the formal level of the institutional and legal framework. According to a study 6 commissioned by the World Bank, Uganda is ranked second to South Africa in almost all aspects of decentralisation in Africa. Ironically though, the same country is ranked among the most corrupt in the world with deplorable service delivery systems. 7 This paper thus seeks to examine Uganda's experimentation with decentralisation with a view to unearthing the subterranean constraints that continue to inhibit the delivery of the great promises of the system. The paper traces the historical background to Uganda's decentralisation process, outlines the current structure of Uganda's decentralisation and closely examines the challenges to the realisation of the promises of decentralisation.

The rationale and historical background of decentralisation in Uganda
Defined as the devolution of powers in terms of public authority, resources, and personnel from the central government to sub-national levels, decentralisation can take different forms. In some cases, decentralisation may denote the transfer of such power from the central government to a province or state, as in the case of federal systems, or could refer to the transfer of such powers to lower levels of government within a unitary system. For the rather obvious reason that Uganda has a unitary system of government, this paper will focus on decentralisation in a unitary system and particularly where powers are devolved from the central government to the lower-level local government. In Uganda's case, the analysis focuses on the devolution of powers from the central government to the district and the lower-level local governments, which include the sub-county, municipality, division and parish.

The historical background of decentralisation in Uganda
The history of decentralisation in Uganda can be traced way back to the colonial days. However, it was not until the rise of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government to power under the leadership of Yoweri Kaguta Museveni 8 that decentralisation was accorded the prominence it enjoys in the country today. It will be recalled that the British, in the execution of their indirect rule policy, established a hybrid system of administration in most of their colonies including Uganda, where some powers were granted to the native leaders while the colonial government reserved overriding powers through the representatives of the colonial government.
In Uganda's case, this system of administration was exemplified by the African Native Authority Ordinance of 1919, 9 which provided for the powers and duties of African chiefs in the colonial administration. Under the Ordinance, chiefs were appointed at the village, sub-county and county levels with powers to collect taxes, preside over native courts, and maintain law and order. These chiefs were, however, 8 Museveni (the president of Uganda from 1986 to date) fought a guerilla war that brought him to power under a system of government known as the National Resistance Movement (NRM), commonly referred to as the Movement Government, which formed the first government under his leadership until 2001, when the country adopted a multiparty system of government. The name Movement was then adopted as the name of his political party, which continues to dominate Uganda's politics. 9 Entebbe, Government Priner 1919.
accountable to the District Commissioner, the executive head of the district and the principal representative of the central government.
The Local Government Ordinance of 1949 10 ushered in new changes by establishing the district as a local government unit with a fairly autonomous administration.
Among the different organs of the district were the District Councils, which were comprised of elected members and were responsible for district administration.
Notably, though, the central government still retained overriding powers over District fundamental changes in local government which culminated in the enactment of the Local Government Statute of 1993 and the subsequent Local Government Act of 1997. Under the same regime, the 1995 Constitution, which adopted and further articulated the local government system of government, was promulgated. The current system of local government is by far more robust and elaborate than any other that was ever attempted in the country's history.

Rationale
The reasons for the adoption of the current system of decentralisation under Museveni were largely internal. Unlike the previous efforts, many of which took the form of the deconcentration 13 of powers from the centre to lower levels of government through representatives of the central government, the current system of local government grants by far the widest and most robust devolution of powers. 14 The adoption of such an ambitious system of local government is partly, and indeed largely, explained by Uganda's post-independence turbulent political history and the peculiar challenges that affected the NRM government in its early days.
Prior to the rise of the NRM government in 1986, Uganda's history had been 13 Deconcentration "involves the transfer of some powers and responsibilities to lower administrative units operated by officials appointed by the central authority, who implement defined functions under tight control." See Oloka-Onyango Decentralisation Without Human Rights? 6-7. 14 The structure of the current system of local government is discussed later in the paper.
Throughout this post-independence period of political turmoil, Uganda experienced various socio-economic challenges ranging from endemic gross violations of human rights through economic plunder and decadence to outright lack of democratic governance. Upon its rise to power through an armed rebellion partly prompted by the then socio-economically decadent situation, the NRM government quite understandably made democratisation one of its major goals. This was vividly captured in one of Museveni's inaugural speeches when he asserted: 15 The first point in our programme is the restoration of democracy. The people of Africathe people of Ugandaare entitled to a democratic government. It is not a favour from any government. It is the right of the people of Africa to have democratic government; the sovereign power in the land must be the population, not the government. In our liberated zones, the first thing we started was the election of Village Resistance Committees. My mother, for instance cannot go to parliament but she can surely become a member of a Committee so that she too, can make her views heard. We have, therefore set up village, muluka (parish), gombolola (sub-county) and district committees … but right now I want to emphasize that our first point in our political programme is democracy for the people of Uganda.
But it should be noted that the creation of local councils (committees) was not originally informed by the desire to create democratic institutions. As Steiner observes, "the local councils were originally established for political reasons and not with the aim of improving service delivery or reducing poverty." 16 In fact, according to Mugabi, the explanation lay in considerations of political expediency. The long protracted war that brought the NRM government to power greatly weakened state organs in the entire country. In areas where war was directly waged government systems were literally non-existent, as the rebel forces had in some cases taken control of parts of such areas. This created an administrative vacuum especially in local governance, which the rebel forces addressed by appointing members of the local communities in the areas they controlled to fill the gaps in local administration.
Resistance Councils comprised of members were accordingly created with both administrative and security mandates in their areas of jurisdiction. Thus: 17 During the "bush war" of the early 1980s, the organs of the state were destroyed, thus creating a vacuum in local governance. The NRM had no spare manpower to utilize as local administrators. Accordingly, local communities were requested to elect from amongst themselves, councils to perform the duties of the defunct agents and organs of the old state. However, the primary role of these councils was to resist infiltration -through a network of information gathering on the operations of the enemy and liaising with the NRM intelligence organshence the name "resistance councils".
Once in power, the NRM government embarked on steps aimed at improving and legally entrenching the resistance council system of administration for the reasons already stateddemocratic governance, filling the gaps in administration created by the destruction of state organs during the war, and the promotion of security. Indeed, Thus, the adoption of the system of democratisation through the devolution of powers can fairly largely be attributed to local factors. Nonetheless, the role of external factors cannot be underestimated. Undoubtedly, Uganda is part of the Third World that has been subjected to some pressure from the donor community to embrace decentralisation as a pathway to democratic governance. Quite compelling assumptions have always been made about the great potential of decentralisation in deepening democracy and these have rendered it a near-universal prescription for addressing the governance challenges faced in the developing world.

Objectives of decentralisation
If well implemented, decentralisation promises efficient and accountable governance through the increased involvement of the people in the way they are governed. That is, decentralisation promotes people's participation in important government functions such as decision making, the identification of problems, priority setting, planning and monitoring the implementation of any programmes, which in effect promotes and ensures the better allocation and utilisation of resources. It is also generally believed that when people are involved in their own governance through decentralisation, accountability on the part of office bearers is enhanced, hence leading to more efficient utilisation of public resources, which in turn promotes development. Decentralisation also promises greater respect for human rights through the involvement of people in the design, planning and implementation of government programmes/policies. Over all, decentralisation enhances the process of governance.
However, the extent to which any decentralised system will deliver these noble objectives depends on more than the mere adoption of the system. While the formal legal framework/structure of any given decentralised system is important in the determination of its success, other extraneous factors such as the level of people's awareness, the availability of the necessary resources and the commitment of the central government are usually critical in determining the degree of success.
Uganda's experience with decentralisation is particularly intriguing given the manifest contradictions between the rather admirable formal legal framework, on the one hand, and the continued deplorable plunder of public resources, impunity, poor service delivery and the continued high rate of violation of human rights, on the other. Before a critical discussion of the challenges faced in the decentralisation process in Uganda is undertaken, the country's highly acclaimed decentralised structure deserves to be briefly discussed.

The structure and functions of local government in Uganda
Local government in Uganda is based on the district as the basic unit. Financially, local governments are entitled to levy, charge and collect local taxes and fees as locally generated revenue. But they also receive grants of different kinds from the central government to supplement their meager revenue collections not only for local programmes but also for the purpose of enabling them to implement government plans at the local level. The different grants given to local government include conditional 22 , unconditional 23 and equalisation grants. 24 All in all, therefore, Uganda's framework of local government entails three different forms of devolution of power, namely: 1) political decentralisation (as evidenced by the election of council members), 2) administrative decentralisation (as evidenced by the appointment of local administration personnel by council), and 3) fiscal decentralisation (as evidenced by the powers granted to local councils to raise local revenue and receive funds from the central government for the implementation of agreed-upon national programmes).

The performance of the decentralised system in Uganda
It is now over two decades since Uganda adopted decentralisation, a system of government considered as a pathway to improving governance in terms of democratisation and service delivery. Yet, as earlier noted, Uganda's level of accountability for public resources and service delivery remains deplorable. This rather ironic situation naturally raises questions about the performance of decentralisation in the country. According to Ndegwa's stocktaking analysis of Uganda's performance in the different aspects of decentralisation, the country appears to be in the best category on the continent. On political decentralisation, the main indicators of which include the number of elected sub-national tiers, the 22 Article 193(3) Uganda Constitution of 1995 defines conditional grants as consisting of monies given to local governments to finance programmes agreed upon between the government and the local governments, which monies are expended only for the purposes for which the grant was made and in accordance with the conditions agreed upon. 23 Article 193(2) Uganda Constitution of 1995 defines the unconditional grant as the minimum grant that shall be paid to local government to run decentralised services. 24 Article 193(4) Uganda Constitution of 1995 defines the equalisation grant as the money to be paid to local government for giving subsidies or making special provisions for the least developed districts, and provides that it shall be based on the degree to which the local government unit is lagging behind the national average standard for a particular service. If these findings are indeed anything to go by, how then does one account for the rather obvious state of decay of local administration, the poor service delivery, and wholesale plunder of public resources that continues to dog the country? It is indeed ironic, and quite baffling, that a country that seems to have even exceeded its expectations in the decentralisation process should also be among the worst performing in terms of accountability and service delivery in its governance system.
While it is certainly difficult to make a claim to having a perfect explanation for the current rather contradictory situation obtaining in the country, a look into the historical background to the adoption of decentralisation could possibly offer some insight. As earlier noted, and quite unlike the experience in other countries where the adoption of decentralisation has been externally driven 27 , Uganda's adoption of a system of devolution of power was partly and largely necessitated by considerations of political expediency. The days when security was a major concern for the NRM regime are long gone. Concerns about resources, be they fiscal or human, may still 25 Ndegwa Decentralization in Africa 3. 26 Ndegwa Decentralization in Africa 4. 27 Steiner acknowledges this fact when she notes: "… Uganda is different from many other countries where decentralisation was motivated by a fiscal crisis of the central government or by external conditionality." (Steiner Decentralisation in Uganda 9).

/ 569
apply but they no longer pose a threat to the government. The effect of this has been the reversal of the commitment to the system of local government by the central government, which now appears to espouse a desire to run the government more from the centre than through local governments, many of which are now proving problematic in the new multiparty political dispensation.
The introduction of multiparty politics in Uganda in the early 2000s engendered a new threat to the NRM government. Unlike the prior "enemy," who could be effectively checked through the Resistance council system, the multiparty system created a different type of "enemy" that could no longer be effectively combated/checked through a system of local council networks. With time, the new "enemy" in the form of the opposition has spread out and taken root in most of the districts, a fact that has shaken the trust once enjoyed between districts (when their councils were predominantly NRMS supporters) and the NRM government at the centre. In fact the discomfort between the NRM government and the local government system started to manifest itself in the early 1990s when opposition groups started to agitate for the restoration of multiparty politics. As Oloka-Onyango aptly notes: 28 The claim that RCs were a system of "popular" selection based on the "individual merit" of the candidates who stood for office was severely undermined by the fact that the state (which was controlled by the NRM) intervened heavily in support of some candidates, while it actively decampaigned, intimidated and blackmailed others. The peak of hypocrisy was reached when President Museveni declared "We have won!" following the 1993 elections for the Constituent Assembly which were originally supposed to be run on an "no party" basis. Who was the "we" in such a situation?
With the restoration of multiparty politics and the steadily waning popularity of the NRM government amidst the rising popularity of the opposition, whose members dominate local councils in some districts, the NRM now finds itself at war for its own survival with the very system it created to bolster its political hegemony. With council members from different political parties comprising the local government councils at all levels, the NRM government finds itself in an unusual position where it can no longer effectively ensure control over local politics. In effect, the councils no longer 28 Oloka-Onyango Decentralisation Without Human Rights? 10-11. enjoy the trust they once wielded from government, and as a result it is hardly surprising that the forces of recentralisation have intensified over time. As the central government strives to ensure stricter control over the affairs of local governments, especially through fiscal and political interference, the concept of decentralisation is steadily losing meaning and giving way to the reconcentration of power in the central government.
Closely related to the loss of trust is the politicisation of the decentralisation process, which is another factor that could explain Uganda's rather paradoxical situation. The original purpose for the creation of resistance (local) councils having been rendered obsolete, the NRM government has skillfully but successfully been able to use the … the strategy of district proliferation has … been adopted by President Museveni as a means of dispensing patronage, and ultimately of splintering challenges to central government hegemony and control.
By using the creation of districts as a reward for political support, the government has been steadily increasing its expenditure portfolio without necessarily balancing it with increased GDP, which has naturally affected the local governments' ability to 29 Oloka-Onyango (n 28 above) 6.
improve on service delivery due to their limited funding. The local government system envisages a financial partnership with the central government in the sense that while the central government remains duty bound to fund national programmes through the local government, the local government too was expected to raise local revenue for the purpose of funding its budget. With limited funding and no reliable source of local revenue, the local governments have been reduced to mere agents of the centre. It is important to note that the government has been notorious in undermining the fiscal autonomy of local governments. For instance, originally the major source of revenue for local governments was graduated tax, which, for clearly Ignorance of procedures among the officials in charge can represent the source of the problem… Many officials simply do not understand the rules of the game, and nobody at the local level is informed about what is going on, who has which plans, and whether plans have been written at all.
Government inefficiency has combined with the old problem of corruption to exacerbate matters. I have been told by many people who work in local government that government usually delays sending grants to local governments. By the time the money is received, the time for some of the planned activities would have passed. In such situations, the local governments have to choose between fabricating records to justify the expenditure of the money or sending the unutilised funds back to central government. While the latter would seem the right option to take, the reality is different: sending money back to the central government is usually construed as a failure on the part of the affected local government and could easily adversely affect future funding. The effect of this government inefficiency has not only been the undermining of service delivery by local governments but also the promotion of corruption.

Conclusion
The ironic outcome of Uganda's policy of decentralisation speaks to the challenges faced generally in the developing world. Decentralisation as a concept is not just about form, in the sense of developing a good legal and institutional framework, as has taken place in Uganda; it is also about content and process. The contradictions that characterise the Ugandan system of decentralisation are explained by factors that require effective mechanisms to address them. The challenges that continue to inhibit the performance of Uganda's decentralised system of governance are peculiar to Uganda's political history and facing up to them will certainly require a change of heart among the government leadership at the very least, or a change of regime. A true commitment to democratic values, where the leadership believes in the genuine empowerment of the masses, is critical to the effective performance of Uganda's decentralised system.

Francis and James 2003 World Development
Francis P and James R "Balancing Rural Poverty Reduction and Citizen

Register of legislation
African Native Authority Ordinance of 1919

Kampala Capital City Authority Act of 2010
Local Government Act of 1997