STAATSRECHT FROM THE HEARTLAND OF THE RECHTSSTAAT Observations on the Significance of South African-German Interaction in Constitutional Scholarship

During (especially the latter half of) the previous century it was impressed on several generations of law students (mainly but not exclusively) at Afrikaans speaking law faculties in South Africa, to pride themselves on their “principled” legal education. Akin to (and indeed associated with) the paranormal knack of “thinking/reasoning like a jurist”, principled legal thinking was not really taught (or learnt), but sustained (like injuries) as a result of exposure to principled law teachers, enhanced by the ambiance of a principle-prone law faculty. In the impressionable, young minds thus shaped Begriffsjurisprudenz was principled legal thinking incarnate, and Germany the Valhalla for those forever true to it.


I
During (especially the latter half of) the previous century it was impressed on several generations of law students (mainly but not exclusively) at Afrikaans speaking law faculties in South Africa, to pride themselves on their "principled" legal education. 1Akin to (and indeed associated with) the paranormal knack of "thinking/reasoning like a jurist", principled legal thinking was not really taught (or learnt), but sustained (like injuries) as a result of exposure to principled law teachers, enhanced by the ambiance of a principle-prone law faculty.In the impressionable, young minds thus shaped Begriffsjurisprudenz was principled legal thinking incarnate, and Germany the Valhalla 2 for those forever true to it.This vast hall has five hundred and forty doors.The rafters are spears, the hall is roofed with shields and breast-plates litter the benches.A wolf guards the western door and an eagle hovers over it.It is here that the Valkyries, Odin's messengers and spirits of war, bring half of the heroes that died on the battle fields (the rest go to Freya's hall Folkvang).These heroes, the Einherjar, are prepared in Valhalla for the oncoming battle of Ragnarok.When the battle commences, eight hundred warriors will march shoulder to shoulder out of each door." PER 2005(1)

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The so-called purist movement in South Africa, 3 whose heyday more or less overlapped with that of the latter-day apartheid regime (1948-1994), bore the torch of principled legal scholarship and jurisprudence.Its adherents preached and promoted -in class but in time also in courtrooms -loyalty to pure Roman-Dutch law, untainted by English legal influence and unperverted by English minded judges' (mis-)understanding of it.Like the legal systems of the Romano-Germanic or civil-law legal family, Roman-Dutch law -the purists' source of and guide to principled legal thinking -is of learned Roman-law extraction.This accounts for the purists' heartfelt empathy with the (German) historical school and, eventually, with the nineteenth century Pandectists who strongly influenced key-facets of the private-law theory taught at Afrikaans speaking law faculties in South Africa. 4aditional South African-German fellow-feelings in law remained restricted to private law (excluding formal private law), criminal law (excluding criminal procedure), legal history, Roman Law as an academic discipline and perhaps legal philosophy and legal theory too (with international law eventually also creeping into the picture). 5Conspicuously underrepresented on the affinity list, for a long time, was the public law relevant for us at this conference, namely constitutional and administrative law which, in the "old" South Africa, was much more English than Roman-Dutch -as was criminal and civil law of procedure and various branches of commercial law.Constitutional and political reform was at any rate not a foremost concern of prominent purist legal scholars in South Africa.The handful of pioneers concerned with such reform felt quite comfortable to seek comparative guidance in the constitutional law of the United States of America -the oldest example of a system of modern-day constitutional democracy. 6Cf in this regard Du Plessis Introduction to Law 57-63; Fagan "Roman-Dutch Law" 60-64.4 For nuanced and insightful discussions of this influence cf Van der Walt 1996 TSAR (3) 521; Van der Walt 1996 TSAR (4) 626; Van der Walt 1992 THRHR 170. 5 For a helpful overview, relating to the Humboldt contribution in particular, cf Rabie, Van der Merwe and Labuschagne 1993 THRHR 608.6 One of these scholars, John Dugard, thought that consistent reliance on the Roman-Dutch (common) law could have boosted the safeguarding of basic human rights in apartheid South Africa and that many of the ills of apartheid were attributable to a lack of rigorous reliance on this "rights-friendly" source of South African law: Dugard 1971 SALJ 181 and 3/30 In the lively debates foreshadowing, accompanying and assessing the first tottering steps of constitutional democracy in South Africa during the 1990s, legal and constitutional comparison were dominant, and among the jurisdictions sourced for comparative examples Germany (and Canada) suddenly moved to the forefront.A number of South African scholars writing about various aspects of our transition to democracy, professed indebtedness to German sources, but not necessarily because these sources breathe the spirit of principledness. 7For the past ten years or so constitutional scholars have not (re-)turned to "the German example" as source of comparative information with an intensity and enthusiasm paralleling that of the mid-nineties.Most comparative studies referring to Germany 8 actually saw the light when South Africa's transitional or interim Constitution 9 was still in force. 10e major object of this conference is to explore with (and for the benefit of) South African scholars, eligible for Von Humboldt stipends, possibilities for postdoctoral research in constitutional and administrative law in Germany.In this background paper I intend pursuing this object in mainly three ways (and not necessarily strictly in the sequence below): • First, to explore the relevance of the German tradition of scholarship for South African legal scholars doing research on matters constitutional.
• Secondly, to reflect on possible reasons for strong South African-German affinities in matters constitutional.4/30 • Thirdly, to reflect on the consequences of the affinities above-said as they have manifested themselves in South Africa's two constitutional texts since 1994 and in our constitutional scholarship and jurisprudence.Here I shall mainly devote attention to some developments since the commencement of South Africa's "final Constitution"11 in 1997.However, at pains to preface rather than pre-empt deliberations on particular issues and themes, this third aspect of the paper will be restricted to bare essentials.
As far as the first two aspects of the paper are concerned, I intend sharing a moderate measure of personal experience too, and this will inevitably put an anecdotal spin on my presentation.I mention this principally to forewarn myself that a successful anecdote is one not centred on the person of the anecdotist, but on the illustrative value of the narrative involved.There is no single explanation for the consequential German influence on constitution-making and the inception of constitutional democracy in South Africa.As suggested before conventional academic affinities in law do not quite explain this phenomenon (but are also not wholly unrelated to it).Mentally many white Afrikaans speaking South Africans in apartheid South Africa identified with the "Germanic" traits in the German Volksgeist.For a long time German was the third language of preference in many an Afrikaans medium, secondary school.Germanist fellow-feelings among some Afrikaners even engendered concurrence in the Nazi notion of "an Arian Herrnvolk", remarkably pulling itself up by its bootstraps after a devastating war -against demonic forces that many Afrikaners, at any rate, regarded as hostile to their cause too.6/30 these ill-placed, pro-German sentiments that brought the markedly German element to the constitutional negotiating table in South Africa.
As apartheid South Africa faced increasing academic isolation, most German institutions involved in academic exchange (universities as well as funding organisations) continued "to provide and keep open channels for comparative research to South African jurists"15 irrespective of race, colour, gender or creed as well as, controversially so, political and institutional affiliation.In the case of Humboldt stipends in law, almost only white, male academics, some approaching and others negotiating midlife, were advantaged by this approach, the only exception being a white female academic in 1986. 16The statistics for other German organisations, supporting academic exchange in law financially, probably did not differ significantly.According to the authors of an article appreciative of the Humboldt Foundation's contribution to the development of the South African legal system and legal literature (hereinafter "the Humboldt article") free access to the German academic world, amid increasing academic isolation elsewhere, resulted in "many South African jurists" relying "less heavily on Anglo-American law for comparative analysis" as well as a markedly "positive influence by German law on South African law reform". 17This last claim will be tested shortly.However, it can safely be assumed that the jurists above-said could not, by themselves, have paved the way for a marked German impact on constitutional developments in South Africa, simply because they lacked the political clout to determine the outcome of decisions during multi-part negotiations (in 1993) and in the Constitutional Assembly (between   1994 and 1996).

II
Predominantly logistic reasons for South African-German interaction in the field of constitutional law and practice have been considered so far.However, what destiny had in store for both countries and both nations, especially during the latter half of the twentieth century, also served to forge an affectionate sense of understanding between them (vast dissimilarities notwithstanding).Germany is an example of a relatively young (post-World War II) democracy from whose experience we in a new South Africa in the making stood to learn a lot. 20The

III
From experience I can say that in the realm of public law scholarship in Germany the phenomenon going by the name "typical German" is rather "We know that the challenges facing South Africa today are in many ways comparable to those that faced Germany after the Second World War.In as much as we benefited immensely from the support of the German people in the struggle against apartheid, we can learn much by drawing on your valuable experiences in reconstruction and development.
The German constitution has, for example, become a popular reference point for South African experts.We believe we can learn much from Germany in the field of combating crime.Above all, history has placed economic reconstruction and national reconciliation at the centre of the challenges faced by both countries."(see ANC 1995 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1995/sp950911.html21 Nov).

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9/30 elusive -especially the "typical German intellectual/professor". Typicalness in German legal scholarship is (typically) associated with the "principled legal thinking" of Begriffsjuriprudenz,21 perceiving the law as a self-contained, rational system of general norms.Legal problems are solved when, through deductive reasoning, a concrete situation is subsumed under a norm appropriate to the exigencies of that type of situation.The state is the source of law and law, in its turn, allegedly rests on an independent foundation of reason and logic.Courts are autonomous institutions that apply the law in a systematic (even mechanistic) way as if it were a system of fixed (and predictable) rules.
The "is" and the "ought" of law are markedly distinct, as are "law" and "morality" as well as "law" and "politics".
German public lawyers working with the Basic Law can hardly afford to buy into the conventional paradigm just described.The Basic Law perceives fundamental rights as anterior to the state and "the state's law" as subject to the objective order of values enshrined in the Basic Law.Law and morality (and law and politics) can therefore not "neatly" be separated.However, to quote Donald Kommers, 22 "the approach to judicial reasoning in Begriffsjurisprudenz has The observations of Kommers also go some way to explain a phenomenon that took me by some surprise when I first came across and reflected on it, and that has ever since intrigued me -(also) because German constitutional scholars take it so much for granted that it is hard to find anyone who cares to explain (let alone justify) it.I refer here to the unquestioned use of FC Von Savigny's 23 four "methods of interpretation" for purposes of constitutional interpretation.
Also known as the "Von Savigny quartet" 24 these so-called methods were initially designed for the interpretation of pandectaerian Roman law, but in time they have gained acceptance all over the European Continent, 25 for the interpretation of codifications of the law, statutes 26 and constitutions. 27In the South African context Hahlo and Kahn 28 first referred to them and since 1994 they have also met with (extra-judicial) approval. 29These methods or modes of interpretation or, more appropriately, reading strategies -Labuschagne 30 speaks of angles of incidence ("invalshoeke") -modelled on a slightly adapted version of the Savignian model, 31 are: • grammatical interpretation concentrating on ways in which the conventions of natural language can assist legal interpretation and can help to limit the many possible meanings of a provision;

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• systematic interpretation, as a manifestation of contextualism, 32 calling for an understanding of a specific provision in the light of the text or instrument as a whole and of extra-textual indicia; • purposive interpretation 33 that sheds light on the possible meanings of a provision with reference to its purpose or ratio, and • historical interpretation situating a provision in the tradition from which it emerged and allowing qualified recourse to information concerning the genesis of the text in which the provision occurs (and concerning the provision itself). 34 short, I think Savigny's four "methods of interpretation" have found acceptance in German constitutional interpretation because (and simply because) their "reason and logic" (and "pedigree", one might perhaps add) appeal to constitutional scholars and judges (as jurists).

IV
Constitutional-law scholarship in Germany is vast, has a long history and accommodates -as is to be expected -diverse and divergent shades and styles of thinking.Endeavouring to discern a mainstream is contentious.For my particular topic(s) it was important also to consult some standard works on legal methodology (Rechtsmethodenlehre). 38As one reads through these general sources, unignorable publications pertinent to more specific aspects of one's research topic start surfacing -often in the form of collective works in which "the best on the topic" has been included, 39 but it can also be in the form of journal articles of restricted scope but lasting effect.For instance, the function, status and limits of theories and methods of (constitutional) interpretation (and of theories and methods of interpretation vis-à-vis one another) can, for instance, be problematic. 40  Article 20 of the basic law states that: (1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social Federal state.(2) All state authority emanates from the people.It is exercised by the people by means of elections and voting and by separate legislative, executive and judicial organs.
(3) Legislation is subject to the constitutional order; the executive and the judiciary are bound by the law.(4) All Germans shall have the right to resist any person seeking to abolish this constitutional order, should no other remedy be possible. 45 the pentarchy Parteienstaat, Rechtsstaat, Streitbare Demokratie, Sozialstaat and Bundesstaat envisaged in article 20 of the Basic Law, at least the first three are also "appointed" (and I guess one could add "anointed") by section 1 of the South African Constitution to shape the nature of the polity.What section 1(d) prescribes is certainly a party state and a competitive democracy, while "rule of law" in section 1(c) is the English common law way of saying "Rechtsstaat", though the two are not exactly synonyms. 46That South Africa is a social state is not really stated in section 1, but it follows by necessary implication from several other constitutional provisions, for example, from section 7(2) that enjoins the state to "promote and fulfil" the rights in the Bill of Rights, from the  I would lay it down as a general principle that where it is possible to decide any case, civil or criminal, without reaching a constitutional issue, that is the course which should be followed.
In some of my own writings I have proposed an adaptation of subsidiarity for use in the South African context. 57I leave the detail for another occasion.It is important for the present to note that this is an area for very fruitful co-operation with our German counterparts in public law and probably also European lawgiven the history of section 39(2) as product of a Drittwirkung debate.

IX
There is much for which we as scholars of and citizens under the South African Constitution can thank our German counterparts.Fortunately they are not in the bad habit of constantly reminding us of it.In the formerly referred to Humboldt article, the authors conclude: 60 Over almost three decades, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation has contributed substantially to the personal development and growth of a number of jurists who have, in turn, exercised a significant influence on both the theory and the practice of South African law.This the Foundation has achieved without endeavouring to transplant German legal doctrine on its South African counterpart.Rather, scholars have been enabled to develop their own legal thought and theory, and so to be part of the evolution of their legal system as they consider appropriate.
In my experience a similar spirit permeates interaction between South African and German scholars in matters constitutional.And I do not think that especially during the last ten to fifteen years it has been just a one way traffic: there is indeed much to be learnt from South Africa and especially from our constitutional enterprise of accommodating (and desiring to celebrate) our diversity as an asset.South Africa's "small miracle", à la Nelson Mandela, 61 can 59 S 33(1)(b).60 Rabie, Van der Merwe and Labuschagne 1993 THRHR 622.61 Cf eg Lawrence "From Soweto to Codesa" 1.

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21/30 only be sustained if we do not take it for granted -and if we share its fruits with kindred spirits the world over.Humboldt exchanges contribute to a considerable extent to the creation of a supra-national context within which this can be done.
The "mighty" ANC relied heavily on the input of their German Berater, Hans-Peter Schneider, Director of the Deutsches Institut für Föderalismusforschung e.V. in Hannover, and Professor of Law at the University of Hannover until had also been (and I presume still is) a principal adviser to the SPD, the social-democratic ANC's kindred soul in Germany.The Democratic Party (as it then was 19 ) found a congenial spirited adviser in Ingo von Münch, formerly Professor of law at the University of Hamburg, and active politician in the German FDP.Quite significantly the predominantly black ANC and the more English oriented DP relied more intensely on the input of German advisers than the Afrikaans oriented NP or Freedom Front.Among the South African technical advisers closely involved in constitutionmaking during the 1990s, there were at least five Humboldt stipendiaries.Working in concert with German law advisers these South Africans were indeed favourably placed to bring on the "positive influence" of German constitutional law in the law reform in South Africa attendant on constitution-making.It is difficult to determine empirically to what extent this indeed happened, but circumstantial evidence points to the likelihood that German (constitutional) law indeed influenced law reform in South Africa in the manner envisaged by the authors of the Humboldt article.

18
Cf eg the contributions of Du Plessis "South Africa's peaceful Revolution" 209-224 and Steyler "Constitutional Promise of Decentralization in Practice" 225-240 in which they reminisce about issues in respect of which Schneider rendered valuable advice.19 Presently the Democratic Alliance (DA).20 On 11 September 1995 the former president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, in his address at a state banquet in honour of former German chancellor, Helmut Kohl, then officially visiting South Africa, for instance said the following: vast majority of African states as well as, for instance, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of course also date from the post-World War II era.However, the German and South African experiences (put next to each other) stand out because of the matchless sense of urgency that, in both cases, permeated constitution-making and the establishment of constitutional democracy.The "Nicht wieder!" from post-Holocaust Germany reverberated (and indeed inspired action) in post-apartheid South Africa.In both countries far-reaching reconciliation and extensive nation-(re-)building simply had (and still has) to succeed to turn calamities of a shady past into accomplishments of a sunny future.The last step of constitutional significance in the German transition to full democracy, the Wiedervereingung, preceded the first step in the South African transition, the commencement of the transitional Constitution and the first democratic elections, by a mere three and a half years, and both moves were bolstered -or occasioned, some might say -by the same historical event(s): the decline of Communist hegemony in the East Block.South Africans and Germans can furthermore, without compromising the modesty becoming citizens of countries that could (still) have been in tatters, celebrate appreciable achievements along the road of constitutionalism so farachievements that add to the worthwhileness of Germany and South Africa as examples for constitutional comparison.
outlasted positivism and has had a lasting influence throughout Europe, including Germany . . .German constitutional scholars no less than the justices of the Federal Constitutional Court have made significant attempts to build a theory of judicial decision based on reason and logic."I think this explains the resoluteness with which even the freest thinkers among the German colleagues in public law I have encountered, can proffer answers to certain questions of law as if the law as it stands is (and can be) uncontentious.The more tentative manner in which South African scholars typically respond when interrogated about the law as it stands, evidences that we are partially made of common law stuff -always ready to defer to any last word that a judicial authority might (for the time-being) have.
By way of example, fairly representative I trust, I wish to give a brief account of my impressions and experiences when I first spent time in Germany some ten years ago, doing comparative research as part of a project entitled Statutory Interpretation in South Africa in the Light of the Adoption of a Bill of Rights. 35My aim was to complete a literature study, reading and collecting materials, making them accessible for later use and compiling a list of available literature 32 Du Plessis (Re-)Interpretation of Statutes 111-115.33 As manifestation of interpretive purposivism, see Du Plessis (Re-)Interpretation of Statutes115-119.34 In the course of time a fifth "method" was added to the Von Savigny quartet, namely comparative interpretation, which facilitates the understanding of a provision, first, in the light of standards of international law and, secondly, in comparison with its counterparts in other national legal systems.35 My unpublished report on the project was written in Afrikaans: Wetsuitleg in Suid-Afrika in die Lig van die Aanvaarding van 'n Menseregtehandves. .Buzzwords for my study were "constitutional interpretation" (Verfassungsinterpretation/-auslegung) and "statutory interpretation" (Gesetzesinterpretation/-auslegung).Normally one would start reading about one's topic(s) in inclusive works in the field (Staats-/Verfassungsrecht) which, in the German context, means beginning with constitutional law textbooks (Lehrbücher) 36 and then, for more detail, moving to Basic Law commentaries.37 I have also come across work of German colleagues, creative in itself, and with catalytic qualities to unleash creative potential in others too.Examples are: • the work of Peter Häberle exploring the idea of "the constitution as an open process"; 42 • Friedrich Müller's strukturierende Rechtlehre which is post-structuralism incarnate -with German consistency and precision, 43 and • Gerhard Robbers' knack of bringing (in his teaching and writing) constitutional ideas to life through appreciation of music, architecture and the plastic arts. 44I mention these examples so as to confront the stereotyped perception that the work of German constitutional law scholars, though thorough and meticulously systematic, is mostly tedious and uncreative.V Let me, in conclusion and as but a curtain raiser to the deliberations that are to follow, briefly take stock of what has happened to provisions of German origin in the South African Constitution -using the 1996 text as point of reference.There is a sense in which the 1996 South African Constitution bears a stronger German resemblance than the 1993 (transitional) Constitution.Section 1 of the former arguably fulfils a role similar to article 20 of the German Basic Law (albeit not in similar terms), namely to characterise the kind of state for which the Constitution provides: The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism.(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.

•
the German Basic Law and the foundational prominence it affords human dignity, will be struck by the statement in section 1(a) of the South African Constitution that human dignity, together with the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms is one of the founding values of the Republic of South Africa as "one, sovereign, democratic state".References to human dignity also occur in certain pivotal provisions in the Bill of Rights (chapter 2 of the Constitution):• Section 7(1) states that the Bill of Rights "affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom".•The general limitation clause, section 36, requires limitations of rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights to comply with the threshold of (amongst others) the extent to which the proposed limitation "is reasonable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom".51In section 39(1)(a) judicial authorities interpreting the Bill of Rights are enjoined "to promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom".The occurrence of the triumvirate of human dignity, equality and freedom in several places in the 1996 Bill of Rights tells where we in South Africa were coming from when we first tried to establish our fledgling constitutional democracy -exactly what article 1 of the Basic Law does with reference to Germany's unique (and sad) holocaust history.Comparable provisions in South Africa's transitional Bill of Rights mentioned freedom and equality, but not dignity.In human rights discourse and practice there is a perennial tension between freedom and equality, especially in a society like South Africa where astounding disparities between the haves and have nots still prevail.To the haves, on the one hand, their freedom is a vital item in the arsenal of whatever have ever more.They are particularly mistrustful of government interfering in their affairs.The have nots, on the other hand, demand government intervention to empower them to gain a rightful share in the country's wealth -and this threatens the position of the haves in whom most of the wealth resides.It was therefore eminently sensible of the authors of the 1996 Constitution to come up with a textual strategy that can help negotiate the seemingly insoluble tension between freedom and equality: the inclusion in the constitutional sections referred to above of the value of human dignity with its particular history (also and especially in Germany) curbs the tendency to over-concentrate attention -in an "either . . .or" manner -on the fear of the haves and the plight of the have nots, and it demands deference to the worth and eminence of both the have nots and the haves as dignified human beings.VIISection 39(2) of the South African Constitution enjoins the judiciary, "[w]hen interpreting any legislation and when developing the common law or customary law" to "promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights".Looked at superficially, this may seem to be a rather trite (and therefore superfluous) injunction.However, not only does this provision have a fascinating history, but it has also become a kingpin in the evolution of South African law.At the 1993 multi-party negotiations there was a strong sentiment against direct horizontal application of the Bill of Rights.It came from (amongst others and strangely enough) the representatives of the South African Communist Party.After an intense and lively debate in which the German notions of mittelbare and unmittelbare Drittwirkung featured freely and prominently, a compromise was reached and subsequently written into sections 7(1) and (2) of the transitional Constitution.The said section left room for a restrictive understanding of the operation of the Bill of Rights, excluding its direct horizontal effect.This was also how the section was eventually construed in the then landmark (and now almost forgotten) Constitutional Court judgement of Du Plessis and Others v De 18/30 Klerk and Another.52Part of the package of the section 7 deal was the inclusion in the transitional Constitution of section 35(3), the predecessor to section 39(2) of the 1996 Constitution, in an attempt to ensure that the provisions of the Bill of Rights will at least have some "radiating effect" on the interpretation and application of non-constitutional law.The wording of the two consecutive provisions is very similar.That is, however, not the case with sections 7(1) and(2) of the transitional Constitution, and their successors in the 1996 Constitution, sections 8(1)-(3).The latter provisions authorise the direct horizontal application of "[a] provision of the Bill of Rights . . . to the extent that it is applicable taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right".There has not been a Du Plessis v De Klerk on section 8 (yet), 53 but there has in the meantime been a Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another, 54 a hurricane that could well be named Alix Jean after a very brave litigant, that has swept through our existing (common and especially private) law, with a force that initially seemed to have washed away all interest in the vexing (yet neglected) question posed by sections 8(1)-(3) of the Constitution, namely: "Precisely how directly do horizontal provisions of the Bill of Rights apply?"In the meantime, however, in the case of Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 55 O'Regan j intimated that direct horizontal application of the Bill of Rights (to natural and juristic persons) is always a possibility, depending on the circumstances of each particular case, but section 8(3) of the Constitution requires any such application of a particular right in the Bill of Rights to be mediated by the common law."Common law" can be the common law as it stands or the common law as developed by the court if the law as it stands does not adequately cater for the exigencies of the situation under consideration.The Constitutional Court's judgement in Carmichele was not an interpretation and application of sections 8(1)-(3), but of section 39(2), and it has opened 52 Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (5) BCLR 659 (1996 (3) SA 850) (CC).53 The way in which s 8 of the 1996 Constitution has been structured, arguably precludes the necessity of an effort as monumental as Du Plessis v De Klerk to unravel the mystery of horizontal application.54 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (10) BCLR 995 (2001 (4) SA 938) (CC).55 Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (2002 5 SA 401) (CC) par 31-34.reform through judicial intervention to such an extent that it has probably become necessary to consider strategies to channel the flood.A possible strategy, which our Constitutional Court has invoked without naming it, is what has become famous in Germany (and all of Europe) by the name of subsidiarity.In S v Mhlungu and Others 56 subsidiarity "made in South Africa" was verbalised as follows: The transitional Constitution contained three provisions that were eventually excluded from the 1996 Constitution.Two of them, sections 35(2) and 232(3) prescribed a widely acknowledged interpretive procedure, known as verfassungskonforme Auslegung in the German context, for the interpretation of, respectively, the Bill of Rights and the Constitution as a whole.The omission of these two provisions from the 1996 Constitution did not preclude judicial reliance on the interpretive procedure they (previously) prescribed 58 and verfassungskonforme Auslegung is still very much part of our constitutional law as it stands.56 S v Mhlungu 1995 (7) BCLR 793 (1995 (3) SA 867) (CC) par 59. 57 Cf Du Plessis (Re-)Interpretation of Statutes 29-32.58 Cf eg Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 273 (SCA).exclusively German was the Wesensgehaltgarantie included in the general limitation clause 59 in the transitional Bill of Rights.Like their German counterparts South African constitutional scholars and lawyers struggled to get to the heart of the essential content of rights and what added to our misery, on this side of the equator, was the fact that we took over a provision with a singular history and then ignored that history when we wrote in into our transitional Bill of Rights.I have not witnessed a single tear being shed over the demise of the Wesensgehaltgarantie in the 1996 Constitution.
Cf eg the discussion of the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence on the rule of law in Currie and De Waal The new Constitutional and Administrative Law 75-81.lastbutnot the least from the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, construing these and other similar provisions.47It is no secret that for historical reasons prominent South Africans at the helm of constitution-making and, subsequently, government in this country, do not cherish federalist sentiments akin to those of their German counterparts.It is therefore not surprising that section 1 of the South African Constitution does not describe South Africa as a federal state.At the same time South Africa is not anti-federal and can best be described as a co-operative as opposed to a competitive federation.48Aprinciple that in Germany is meant to counteract the fragmentation of the federation, is invoked in South Africa to impel co-operation among the various spheres of government.This principle, of course, is the German notion of Bundestreue which, in Chapter 3 of the South African Cf eg the discussion of the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence on the rule of law in Currie and De Waal The new Constitutional and Administrative Law 119-124.49 See n 20 above.50 For a reference to this visit, cf ANC 1998 http://www.anc.org.za/people/delange.html21 (3) Die Gesetzgebung ist an die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung, die vollziehende Gewalt und die Rechtsprechung sind an Gesetz und Recht gebunden.(4)Gegenjeden, der es unternimmt, diese Ordnung zu beseitigen, haben alle Deutschen das Recht zum Widerstand, wenn andere Abhilfe nicht möglich ist." 46 Constitution, goes by the name of "co-operative government".On an official visit to South Africa in September 1995 49 former German chancellor, Helmut Kohl, invited South Africa's constitution-makers to send a delegation to Germany to study aspects of German constitutionalism.A multi-party delegation, consisting mainly of members of the National Assembly and advisers, visited Germany from 8 to 15 January 1996.50One of the outcomes of this visit was that German ideas on federalism were included in South Africa's 1996 constitutional text without, however, fully embracing the German system of federalism whose centrifugal impetus is arguably more powerful than that of the South African system.Nov (parliamentarian and deputy-minister Johnny de Lange's curriculum vitae).I am also indebted to Prof Francois Venter of the North-West University, Potchefstroom, who provided me with an oral account of this visit and its consequences.