Mapping Khayelitsha

The complexities of everyday policing in a high crime area

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In order for a single South African police station to operate optimally, or indeed at any level of functionality at all, it is required to form cooperative relations with a host of external institutions. This is in addition to ensuring that the internal structural capacity of a police station is maintained. The Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Police Inefficiency and a Breakdown in Relations between SAPS and the Community in Khayelitsha identified shortcomings in both internal structures and the functioning of external relations. Here, we provide an overview of the stakeholders that make up the policing web in Khayelitsha. This forms the basis for clearer understandings of on-the-ground policing in this unsafe and violent neighbourhood.

The prevention of crime is listed as the first objective of the South African Police Service (SAPS) in section 204(3) of the South African Constitution.¹ The adoption of a community policing model in 1995 directed the emphasis of policing toward establishing ‘partnerships’ with community bodies, thus developing collaborative crime prevention strategies. This required the SAPS to set up structured consultative forums – community policing forums (CPFs) – and cooperative relationships with a host of other community, public and government bodies.²

Given the role the police played in upholding the apartheid regime, especially in neighbourhoods such as Khayelitsha, the post-apartheid service has essentially had to build on a legitimacy deficit. The result has been that police legitimacy has come to be linked to police effectiveness.³ If effectiveness is measured in the ability of policing bodies to perform their role as safety and security providers, the SAPS in Khayelitsha has displayed major failures. In all Khayelitsha precincts, residents feel unsafe, especially at night, and feel particularly vulnerable to crimes such as robbery.⁴

The commission of inquiry into policing in Khayelitsha offers a unique window into the challenges of implementing the community policing model, especially in a high crime, violent, unsafe, and relatively poor neighbourhood. As well as revealing significant inefficiencies within police stations, the commission’s report offers a detailed investigation and exposition of the external relations of the SAPS in Khayelitsha. Operating from August 2012 to August 2014, the commission examined inefficiencies in the three police stations: Site B, Harare, and Lingelethu West, and the breakdown of relations between the SAPS and the community.

Since the commission, the police in Khayelitsha (in the absence of directives from the national commissioner or minister of police)⁵ have been

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engaging with the commission’s recommendations and seeking to ‘bridge’ certain policing gaps. This has manifested most prominently in the ‘Joints’ process, composed of SAPS station and cluster representatives, civil society organisations, local community and political leaders, and other police and government stakeholders. Composed of sub-forums on social and policing issues in Khayelitsha, including alcohol abuse, vigilantism, gender-based violence and transport safety, the Joints meets regularly. While these steps indicate responsiveness on the SAPS’s part, there have been problems, including poor attendance and participation, a lack of leadership within some forums, and a still-forming strategic plan. Nonetheless, these processes are ongoing and it is too early to analyse any potential outcomes.

A further complication arose when, in August 2015, a number of contradictory responses by the SAPS leadership regarding the commission were made public. On 8 August, the National Commissioner, Riah Phiyega, was reported to have dismissed the commission and its findings, arguing that it was an ‘expensive and resource-hungry paper exercise’. In contrast, on 24 August, Police Minister Nathi Nhleko and Western Cape Premier Helen Zille released a joint statement announcing a task team to engage with and implement the recommendations of the commission. Given these inconsistent messages coming from the ‘top’, the national police support for the Joints and other implementation initiatives is somewhat opaque. This leaves SAPS Khayelitsha having to engage with multiple layers of politics: from internal SAPS politics to provincial and national political dynamics (because the commission propelled their work onto the national and media stages). This is, of course, in addition to the layers of complex local politics and policing challenges they face on a daily basis.

Though the commission has provided a wealth of information, its narrow remit, as Super has pointed out, meant that it focused on ‘police inefficiency’ rather than the broader socio-economic context of crime. In this article we provide a concise overview of the policing web in Khayelitsha. It is worth noting that we concentrate on just three of South Africa’s 1 100 police stations. While some of the problems faced by the SAPS in Khayelitsha may be widespread, insofar as they are a manifestation of problematic or restrictive national directives or policy, we have limited our focus to the Khayelitsha cases. The inter-web of police and community in every case will be determined by its specific context, history, community, and working relations. Indeed, this article can perhaps be generalised insofar as we show that a mapping or overview of police relations is a necessary first step in understanding the nature, severity and variation of policing challenges at the station level.

The article comprises three sections. Firstly, we briefly outline internal police structures in Khayelitsha. Secondly, we map the external organisations and bodies that have connections to SAPS Khayelitsha. Thirdly, we briefly assess the implications of this web of external and internal inter-workings.

**Internal structures**

An individual SAPS police station typically has three working divisions: Visible Policing (VISPOL), Crime Investigation (Detective Branch) and the Support Services (see Figure 1). Additionally, Crime Intelligence is a hybrid or overarching body, which manages the horizontal inter-workings between VISPOL and Crime Investigation. Here, we will briefly chart the roles and duties of officers in each division. While there are some variations in performance across Khayelitsha’s three police stations, it is possible to combine them insofar as they face common inefficiencies and problems.

**Visible policing**

Member officers of the VISPOL division are uniformed, and often at the frontline of police–public interactions. VISPOL members are responsible for running the Community Service Centre (CSC); managing police holding cells; conducting sector patrols; court security; firearm, liquor and second hand goods policing; and undertaking crime prevention activities. The commission found that CSCs – the main location of direct engagement between police and the community – created and extended poor relations. Public access to police services was hindered by the repeated failure to answer telephones. There was evidence of recurring instances where police officials either refused to...
open case dockets for complainants or intentionally created obstacles to laying a charge. Given the function of crime statistics – as a reflection of police performance and police–public relations – there is a direct incentive to under-record crimes reported at CSC offices. A compounding factor preventing police work is that many trained VISPOL members spend much of their time on clerical tasks, such as certifying documents for members of the public. Overall, there were complaints that officers are discourteous and unhelpful.

With regard to sector policing, sector profiles were poorly compiled and patrols infrequent. SAPS members rarely conducted patrols of informal neighbourhoods (see Figure 2, where informal neighbourhoods in Khayelitsha are shaded in green). This was a reflection, the police claimed, of the inaccessibility of these areas, and a lack of knowledge about area layouts. Since the inquiry, Crime Intelligence has been updating sector profiles and pulling in community groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to provide updated information, as well as adopting the map (on the next page) produced by Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU).

Crime investigation

The Detective Service Centre (DSC) tasks include screening dockets; interviewing complainants; managing crime scenes; collecting and recording evidence; and updating case dockets. Crucially, the commission revealed that many crimes are not properly investigated, and, in some cases, not at all. This is partially an outcome of consistent understaffing of the detective services in Khayelitsha. As a result, each investigative officer is forced to carry a huge case load. As Brigadier Dladla testified to the commission: “You know in the movies … you see a team descending to a crime scene, attending to a docket, but here you have a team of dockets
descending on a detective.\textsuperscript{18} Furthermore, the
detective services failed to provide regular
feedback to complainants, witnesses and bereaved
family members.

**Crime intelligence**

Crime Intelligence is primarily responsible for
establishing the precinct’s overall crime situation.
Working with VISPOL and Detective Services, the unit
should direct crime prevention and investigation. The
commission revealed serious weaknesses in crime
intelligence in Khayelitsha, with insufficient evidence
of case linkage analysis, identification of hotspots,
crime mapping, or fieldwork.\textsuperscript{19} As a result, the three
police stations, according to De Kock, are ‘policing
by chance and luck and clearly not [by] intelligence-
led policing’.\textsuperscript{20}

Overall, all three policing divisions of Khayelitsha
stations, the commission revealed, have significant
inefficiencies, and report high rates of ‘unexplained
absenteeism’.\textsuperscript{21} The shortcomings appear to be a
result of a lack of professionalism and poor attitudes
and, on the face of it, are easily preventable through
improved management and discipline. However,
and perhaps relatedly, many of these inefficiencies
can similarly be attributed to the lack of resources –
both personnel and physical assets such as police
vans – available to the police stations in Khayelitsha.
SAPS’s resource system, according to then Lieutenant
General Lamoer, is ‘fundamentally irrational’, with high
crime areas such as Khayelitsha receiving insufficient
allocations.\textsuperscript{22} Similarly, other national level policies,
such as the way in which station performance is
measured (through crime statistics), creates perverse
incentives, which can erode community relations.

**External structures**

Apart from the intricate internal web of a Khayelitsha
police station, its effective functioning is dependent
on the relationships it maintains with a host of external
bodies – where ‘external’ refers to bodies that do not
form part of the immediate structures of an individual
station (as shown in Figure 3).
Police forums

**Cluster office**

The Khayelitsha cluster contains the three Khayelitsha police stations, Macassar, Lwandle, Somerset West, Gordon’s Bay and Strand. As such, the cluster office faces challenges in overseeing police stations in a number of very different neighbourhoods. Importantly, there is great uncertainty about the role of the office within the cluster, because while it has ‘co-coordinating and oversight’ functions on a day-to-day basis, these do not extend to operational authority. In other words, members of the cluster office, while presiding over members at station level, do not have the authority to provide operational directives, or to manage discipline issues. This reality diverges from national policy, where the cluster office is seen as having both oversight and operational powers.

**FCS Unit**

The Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences (FCS) Unit has a mandate to investigate all crimes (other than murder) that involve child victims, inter-familial crimes of assault and attempted murder, and any sexual offences, including cases of rape and incest. When a victim enters a Khayelitsha police station, the procedure is to immediately contact the FCS unit (operating on a 24-hour basis), which sends an investigative officer to conduct an interview in a victim-friendly room.

The commission highlighted serious operational issues within the Khayelitsha FCS Unit. Shortcomings identified included understaffing; low morale; a large backlog of cases; poor quality of investigations; and a lack of crime intelligence capacity. Specifically, the Khayelitsha Thuthuzela Care Centre, which assists victims of rape and assault, indicated that the police were not fulfilling their role satisfactorily. Dr Genine Josias, head of the centre, noted that police members of the FCS Unit were highly disorganised, poorly managed, failed to attend stakeholder meetings, and had a poor response rate to calls. She noted two disturbing cases, the first of which involved the SAPS ignoring her attempts to signal a serial rapist; the second where a number of forensic ‘rape kits’ were dumped by FCS investigating officers. Overall, Khayelitsha had the ‘worst performing FCS unit’ in the province.
**Metropolitan police and traffic police**

Officers of the Cape Town Metropolitan Police have three primary functions: the policing of traffic laws; the enforcement of the city’s by-laws; and crime prevention.\(^{29}\) Metro police are responsible for patrolling high-risk crime areas, monitoring the City’s CCTV footage, and responding to emergency calls.\(^{30}\) Criminal suspects arrested by Metro officers (who only have search and seizure powers) are handed over to the SAPS for investigation.\(^{31}\) In Khayelitsha, the traffic police work with the SAPS to manage traffic, especially around the N2 highway. However, the reach of other Metro police bodies in Khayelitsha is limited; for example, the specialised gang unit focuses its operations elsewhere in the Cape Flats.\(^{32}\)

Overall, ‘external’ police structures in Khayelitsha have insufficient presence, power and/or capacities. The serious institutional failings at the cluster and FCS levels have negative consequences on police station performance in Khayelitsha.

**Oversight bodies**

**Western Cape Department of Community Safety**

There has been a national-level ‘divergence of views’ between the SAPS and the Department of Community Safety (DoCS) regarding the power of DoCS as an oversight body. In effect, DoCS has been prevented from investigating police activity in Khayelitsha.\(^{33}\) The commission was important because it firmly established that the Constitution gives DoCS the right to oversight, including unannounced visits to CSCs.\(^{34}\)

**Civilian Secretariat**

The Civilian Secretariat for Police, established in its current form in 2011,\(^{35}\) became fully-fledged only in April 2014.\(^{36}\) In its oversight capacity, the Secretariat is responsible for developing and assessing the policies of the SAPS, their implementation, and at the provincial level, monitoring police–community relations.\(^{37}\)

**Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID)**

The IPID allows members of the public to lay a complaint against a member of the SAPS. Types of complaints that require mandatory investigation include any deaths or rapes that occur while the victim is in police custody; any deaths resulting from police action; complaints about the discharge of a police firearm by an officer; rape by a police officer (on or off duty); any complaints relating to torture or assault by a police officer; and any corruption-related complaints.\(^{38}\) The IPID can, where appropriate, make disciplinary recommendations. The commission revealed that only five out of the 67 complaints made to the IPID from the three police stations in Khayelitsha showed a ‘substantiated’ outcome, where the rest were classed as ‘unsubstantiated’, and not pursued. This raises questions about the ability of the IPID as an investigative body. It is also, to some extent, a reflection of solidarity among police officers, and an unwillingness to give evidence against colleagues.\(^{39}\)

In summary, while there are a number of oversight bodies that operate across Khayelitsha police stations, all face limitations; from restricted access, to infancy, to ineffective investigation. If we add in the SAPS cluster office, one has to wonder how and if these bodies – all with different yet overlapping oversight mandates – can, and do, ‘talk’ to one another and/or coordinate recommendations; and how, and who, the police stations must and can take instruction from. The independence of these bodies undoubtedly has merits, but without clear operational guidelines on the SAPS’s part, oversight bodies will remain limited in their capacity to affect on-the-ground policing.

**Public services**

**Health services**

The SAPS is one of the key role players in the government’s policy of ‘victim empowerment’, led by the Department of Social Development. Rather ambiguously, among a set of other principles, the SAPS is expected to ‘refer victims to support services’.\(^{40}\) The SAPS Victim Empowerment Service manual outlines that an officer who comes into contact with a victim of crime must ensure the safety of the victim, arrange medical assistance if necessary, and preserve any possible evidence from the medical practitioner/hospital/clinic.\(^{41}\) As the Khayelitsha Thuthuzela cases have shown, this set of actions is not always followed.
Another important health services actor for SAPS Khayelitsha is the Forensic Pathology Service (FPS). In situations where a victim has died of unnatural causes, the function of the unit is to inspect crime scenes and transport bodies of the deceased to the mortuary for autopsy. It is the responsibility of the SAPS to secure a crime scene, perform blood splatter analysis, and collect fingerprints. However, the commission heard that the FPS often found crime scenes insufficiently protected, allowing for contamination; and that investigating officers were often absent from crime scenes.42

Given the importance of connections between SAPS police stations and health services — for victims in need of medical attention, and to aid investigations — it is vital that relations to these external structures are functional. Evidence from the commission suggests that the poor performances of the FCS Unit and Detective Services limited the SAPS’s ability to investigate crime and assist victims.

**Schools**

Gangsterism, drugs and violence present major disturbances to the learning environment in Khayelitsha schools. Many children are inhibited from accessing education as they fear going to and from school and being in the classrooms. Teachers have expressed similar fears. School principals who testified drew attention to the fact that children bring weapons onto school premises to protect themselves.43

A ‘Partnership Protocol’ between the Department of Basic Education and the SAPS commits both bodies to support and implement crime prevention programmes in schools.44 SAPS Khayelitsha has been involved in a variety of initiatives, including conducting random searches and walkabouts on school campuses, monitoring the movement of children to and from school, and attending strategy meetings. However, learners have found ways to overcome these obstacles, and gangsterism is still rife.45 Thus, while the working relationship between SAPS Khayelitsha and schools in the area is established and engaged, the broader problem of gangsterism prevents the police from managing crime in schools. Rather than a matter of internal, institutional failure, this is a manifestation of policing in an unsafe neighbourhood.

**Emergency services**

The Emergency Medical Service (EMS) relies heavily on the SAPS in Khayelitsha because, in many circumstances, ambulances may not enter the neighbourhood without police backup. Emergency personnel have been subject to abuse, including stoning of ambulances, theft and aggressive behaviour.46 The need for the SAPS to ‘shadow’ emergency vehicles generates logistical challenges, and, once more, reflects the challenges of policing in an unsafe neighbourhood, where extra demands are placed on SAPS officers.

**Justice mechanisms**

**Courts – Khayelitsha Magistrate’s Court**

Two Detective Court Case Officers (DCCOs) and four liaison officers are assigned by the SAPS to the Khayelitsha Magistrate’s Court (including the six district courts and four regional courts). The DDCOs — whose purpose is to monitor docket flows and communicate between prosecutors and investigating officers47 — are possibly the only explicit and full-time SAPS positions where inter-connections to an external body form the primary function of officers’ work. In spite of this, the commission revealed, prosecutors found case dockets missing, resulting in cases being struck off the role.48 In addition, highlighting the limits of detective work (including insufficient coordination with the Metro Police), the commission found that despite the presence of City CCTV cameras, none had ever been used as part of SAPS investigations.

**Community relations**

The adoption of a community-centred strategy for policing was pivotal to the SAPS’s post-apartheid reform. The underlying assumption is that through a collaborative process, police and community members are better equipped to identify policing needs specific to their area.50 However, given the history of formal policing in Khayelitsha (or lack thereof), establishing community relations is particularly challenging and important. The commission identified a number of pre-established and operational alternative, informal forms of policing
in Khayelitsha. These – often enacted through politically affiliated street committees and taxi associations – are, in some ways, in direct opposition to the SAPS.

**Community policing forums (CPF)**

CPFs represent the structured forum wherein police officials consult with community members. Each precinct has a corresponding CPF headed by the station commander. The purposes of the CPF are to develop problem-solving strategies for addressing crime, and to improve the transparency and accountability of the police. However, CPFs in Khayelitsha have not been successful in establishing a strong partnership between the SAPS and the community. A survey of residents found that less than half of the participants were even aware of CPFs, and of those, only around 20% had any involvement in them. Community members who attended CPF meetings expressed frustration that they were unproductive and tended to be politically dominated (as discussed below).

**Neighbourhood watches**

Neighbourhood watches in Khayelitsha are funded by DoCS, and managed by the VPUU. Volunteers patrol neighbourhoods, and police officers are meant to provide support, including accompanying patrols. However, the commission found that SAPS members rarely joined patrols, nor did they provide crime-related information. In some cases, neighbourhood watches had not been accepted by the street committees working in the area and had faced assault.

**Civil society groups**

There are numerous civil society bodies and NGOs that operate in Khayelitsha. A list of role players includes the Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF); taxi associations (CODESA being the most prominent); the South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO); the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and faith-based organisations. The Khayelitsha Commission itself was established after complaints were laid by a group of NGOs comprising the Social Justice Coalition (SJC), Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), Equal Education, Triangle Project and Ndifuna Ukwazi. The relationships of civic bodies to SAPS Khayelitsha vary greatly, as does their respective power in the community. In Khayelitsha, the ANC-aligned KDF and SANCO are particularly powerful, and often come into opposition with Democratic Alliance (DA) supporters and organisations associated with the DA. Both SANCO and KDF have, for example, dominated CPFs. Together, they operate as gatekeepers of safety or ‘informal justice’. Street committees, for example, are seen as ‘belonging’ to SANCO, and have operated (from apartheid until today) largely outside the remit of the SAPS. SANCO has also been connected to taxi associations that ‘deal’ with youth gangs. The KDF sees itself as the party that ‘should address … violent service delivery protests’, rather than CPFs or the SAPS. Interestingly, and highlighting their political influence, all ward councillors in Khayelitsha serve ex officio on the KDF. The SAPS has to continually engage with SANCO and the KDF, and needs their support in order to function. Yet many of SANCO and the KDF’s operations deliberately circumvent SAPS-community structures. This creates complex political challenges for the SAPS in Khayelitsha, and the power of these organisations within the community can block police work and broader community engagement. Even in the Joints, post-commission processes, this pattern remains troublesome. While some civil society organisations are heavily engaged in the Joints, others remain absent. Interestingly, Ndifuna Ukwazi and the SJC are particularly active in the Joints, whereas the KDF and SANCO lack representation. The absence of key civil society stakeholders raises questions about the reach and potential effectiveness of the Joints.

**Local businesses**

Business crime in Khayelitsha is significant, with foreign (especially Somali) owned spaza shops being particularly targeted, as well as formal businesses in Khayelitsha Mall. One of the challenges of preventing and prosecuting business (and general) crime in Khayelitsha is the lack of shop and private CCTV cameras. Policing in richer areas is aided by collaborative partnerships with businesses and individuals who have their own security and/or CCTV technology, which they share with SAPS for crime investigations.
Overall, informal community networks that work to manage crime in Khayelitsha are at odds with formal police structures. These bodies can come to use non-legal, informal means of ‘justice’, including vigilantism.64 Given the SAPS’s poor performance in Khayelitsha, these alternative mechanisms for policing dominate, and even inhibit the police from developing positive community relations. The police–public cycle thus becomes self-reinforcing and perpetuated. This presents a vital challenge for SAPS police stations in Khayelitsha, and one that is not easily overcome.

**Implications**

From the mapping, it becomes clear that policing challenges are a reflection, broadly speaking, of both context and internal SAPS structuring.

Inefficiencies are caused by poor police station performance and by institutional problems at the cluster and national levels. Given the highly centralised nature of the SAPS, universal policies – notably resource allocation – do not always accommodate situations on the ground, or provide equal service. Within the SAPS, problematic institutional policing cultures have developed. For example, the sentiment that ‘cowboys don’t cry’ – the idea that ‘strong’ police officers do not need to undergo counselling and debriefing measures despite being exposed to a great deal of violence and trauma – is especially troubling in high crime neighbourhoods like Khayelitsha.65 In addition, the poor behaviour of some highly ranked police officers has created organisational contradictions. On the one hand, the SAPS prides itself on integrity. On the other hand, there have been multiple reports of corruption in the organisation and a marked lack of strong, respectable leadership.66 This may create ‘institutional confusion’, and compromise the behaviour of lower ranked officers.

Furthermore, within the SAPS there is a lack of provision for establishing external relations. With the exception of DCCOs, there are no station-level positions that focus on creating effective external inter-workings. The problem is, of course, compounded by the highly centralised, militarised and strictly confined organisational processes of the SAPS.67 These institutional operating procedures may differ from external but related bodies.68 For example, a medical professional’s Hippocratic Oath may, at times, be at odds with a police officer’s mandate to investigate and prevent crime. The SAPS’s lack of operational ability to ‘talk’ to and function with external bodies limits the possibilities of community policing.

The station-level mapping also illustrates that in high crime, relatively poor neighbourhoods, extra demands are placed on the police. From patrolling schools, to shadowing ambulances, to providing clerical services to the public, to investigating crime without community resources such as CCTV cameras, SAPS Khayelitsha has multiple additional burdens on top of high crime rates and corresponding high case levels.

**Conclusion**

While this article is predominantly descriptive, we argue that only by mapping SAPS Khayelitsha’s policing web can we come to recognise the complexities of policing. The nature and inter-workings of the police in relation to external bodies, and internally, will vary according to context. While Khayelitsha presents a challenging context, the commission revealed that the degrees and types of under-performance of SAPS police stations in Khayelitsha were unacceptable. Given the distrust of the police, as indicated through the lack of community participation in CPFs and Joints forums, it is vital the police understand and make efforts to address poor community relations. It is similarly important that analysts appreciate the complex socio-political and organisational webs that the SAPS has to interact with. Thus, we contend, creating overviews of station-level police networks is a useful and necessary exercise in understanding on-the-ground policing.

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**Notes**

3. B Bradford et al., What price fairness when security is at stake?: police legitimacy in South Africa, Regulations and
In one Joints meeting, for example, a representative of the gender-based violence sub-forum called for assistance owing to the lack of strategic planning, direction and leadership within the sub-body. Personal notes, Joints meeting, University of Cape Town, 18 April 2015.

The policing web, as a concept and model, was first comprehensively presented by Brodeur. His web goes beyond police themselves to external webs. Importantly, Brodeur argues the policing web will vary by context, policing history and culture. See JP Brodeur, ‘As unremarkable as the air they breathe’?: reforming police management in South Africa, Current Sociology, 52:5, 2004, 784–808.

We have attended several meetings, and acquired minutes used the Joints meetings as a more limited access point.

Our application to formally interview SAPS members in Khayelitsha was declined by the SAPS Western Cape Provincial Office, which stated: ‘SAPS Management is still addressing the Khayelitsha Commission recommendations to provide to the Minister of Police’ (Brigadier HD Heilbron, addressing the Khayelitsha Commission recommendations on policing, 24 August 2015, http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Task-team-to-tackle-Khayelitsha-Commission-recommendations-on-policing-20150824 (accessed 26 August 2015).

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46 Ibid., 179.
47 Ibid., 237.
48 Ibid., 164.
49 Ibid., 371–373.
50 Ibid., 306.
51 Ibid., 51.
54 Ibid., 187–188.
55 Ibid., 189.
56 Ibid., 22.
57 Ibid., xxii.
60 Ibid., 408.
61 Ibid., 119.
62 The KDF and SANCO have no chair, deputy chair or secretary roles on any of the eight sub-forums. See Safe Khayelitsha, www.safekhayelitsha.org.za (accessed 23 August 2015).
63 Commission of Inquiry, *Towards a safer Khayelitsha*, 428; Colonel Alma Wiese, Business crime sub-forum, presentation, Joints meeting, University of Cape Town, 18 April 2015.
64 G Super, *Violence and democracy in Khayelitsha*.
67 After 1994, there was a move away from the militaristic ranking system that was associated with the apartheid police force. See J Rauch, *Police reform and South Africa’s transition*, paper presented at the South African Institute for International Affairs conference, 2000. However, in the early 2000s, along with the discourse around implementing a ‘war against crime’, there was a shift back to the paramilitary style of policing. See Bradford et al., *What price fairness when security is at stake?*, 249.