

Implications of en masse recruitment for the South African Police Service

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This article is concerned with the process of en masse recruitment implemented within the South African Police Service since 2002. As a result of this process the personnel strength of the SAPS has increased dramatically from 120 549 in 2002 to 199 345 in 2012, an increase of over 65%. A large proportion of SAPS personnel are now people who have joined since 1994 and particularly since 2002. En masse recruitment has in part addressed the legacy of apartheid by promoting racial and gender representativeness in the SAPS. In so doing it has facilitated entry into the civil service by a significant number of black, and particularly African,¹ South Africans, thus contributing to 'class formation'. At the same time the process does not ensure political non-partisanship on the part of the SAPS. It also has not necessarily contributed to 'better policing' in South Africa. While it may have increased the potential that the SAPS will enjoy legitimacy, this cannot be achieved by recruitment alone.

In the period 2002 to 2012 the South African government dramatically increased the personnel strength of the SAPS through a sustained process of en masse recruitment. As a result the size of the SAPS has increased substantially from a personnel strength of 120 549 in 2002, to 199 345 at the end of March 2012. This figure includes 157 475 police officers (with the remainder being support or administrative staff). This article provides an overview of data that show the impact of this process on the racial and gender profile of the SAPS. The recruitment drive has partly addressed the legacy of apartheid by promoting racial and gender representativeness in the SAPS.²

After providing a statistical overview of the impact of the process, this article raises questions about its implications. The article argues that the significant number of male and female black South Africans who have entered the civil service has contributed to 'class formation' and the

achievement of racial and gender justice, relative to past discrimination. However, the process may not have reduced the susceptibility of the SAPS to political manipulation, and has not consistently contributed to 'better policing' in South Africa.³ It has also failed to ensure the SAPS's legitimacy.

THE SAPS: 1994-2003

In 1994, prior to its amalgamation with the 'homeland' police forces, the South African Police (SAP) was 45% white with the ten homeland police services all 99-100% black (African). The SAP was however substantially bigger (112 057 personnel) than the combined personnel strength of the homeland police forces (28 791 personnel). When the SAPS was established by the amalgamation of these 11 police forces in 1995 it was 36% white and 64% black (including 'coloured' and Indian personnel).⁴

Nevertheless, despite the greater overall number of black personnel in the SAPS, the upper ranks were overwhelmingly white and male. For instance, '[i]n 1995, personnel holding the rank of "Brigadier" were 80% white, with only one female Brigadier

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out of the 202 Brigadier posts in the combined police forces. ... Women made up 18% of total police strength, and only 11% of the officer ranks.⁵

As illustrated in Table 1, these proportions have changed fairly steadily over the years. However, on closer inspection it is apparent that there are very distinct differences between the shifts in the racial profile of the SAPS between 1995 and 2003, and those subsequent to this period.

Table 1: Change in SAPS racial profile 1998 – 2012

	African	'Coloured'	Indian/ Asian	White	Total
1995 ⁶	75 414	10 732	4 605	50 097	140 848
%	54%	7%	3%	36%	100
2003 ⁷	79 864	13 318	4 864	33 523	131 569
%	61%	10%	3,7%	25%	100
2012 ⁸	149 174	21 228	5 293	23 650	199 345
%	75%	11%	2,7%	12%	100

During the initial period after amalgamation there was no consistent process of recruitment. In the immediate post-1994 period, government in fact implemented a moratorium on recruitment.⁹ As a result, the total number of personnel across all race groups initially declined.¹⁰ Though the moratorium was lifted in 1996,¹¹ the SAPS only began a formal process of recruitment in 1998, after which recruitment was maintained at relatively modest levels.

The main changes in the overall racial profile of the SAPS in the eight-year period from 1995 to 2003 arose from a dramatic reduction in the total number of white SAPS personnel: the total number of white staff fell by more than 16 500. This was partly due to natural attrition: retirements, deaths, ordinary resignations and dismissals arising from disciplinary action. However, an important factor was also the generous voluntary severance packages that were available to personnel in the upper ranks of the SAPS. These were introduced with the intention of encouraging white personnel to leave, thereby creating space for black appointments at the upper levels.¹² During this period, the total number of black (African, 'coloured' and Indian) personnel increased by 8% from 90 751 to 98 046.

EN MASSE RECRUITMENT, 2003 – 2012

During the nine year period from 2003-2012 the changes in personnel were very different. In this period the total number of white personnel fell substantially (by a figure of 9 873) and, as illustrated in Table 1, the total number of black personnel increased dramatically, by 77 649, or 79%. The net effect is that during the ten years from 2002 to 2012 the total number of SAPS personnel increased by 65% to just under 200 000, including more than 150 000 police officers.

In order to understand the major change in the racial profile of the SAPS in this period it is necessary to examine the process of en masse recruitment first introduced in 2002. In the post-1994 period crime, particularly violent crime, has been at high levels, and there has been substantial pressure on government to improve its response to the problem.¹³ Given the increase in personnel strength of the SAPS it would seem that government believed an increase in the number of police would bring crime down.

It is not clear that recruitment on such a grand scale was envisaged at the start of the process. Government's 2003 Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) provided for an increase in SAPS personnel to 152 560 by March 2006,¹⁴ while the 2005 MTEF envisaged an increase to 165 850 by the end of March 2008.¹⁵

It is also not clear that the motivation for, or implications of the process were considered, other than superficially. In the initial stages in 2002,¹⁶ and in some subsequent reports,¹⁷ the recruitment drive was motivated for on the basis that it would enable the SAPS to better implement 'sector policing' and that this would 'increase[s] the visibility of and access to police officers, particularly in poor areas where crime levels are high'. Subsequent motivations (over 2007, 2008 and 2009) included providing additional personnel for a newly established 'protection and security services division' (2005),¹⁸ and improving 'the capacity of the SAPS to perform security functions at borderlines, ports of entry and exit, and during

the 2010 FIFA World Cup.¹⁹ In 2010 the motivation given for ongoing en masse recruitment was the need to improve crime investigation. The high level of recruitment would, it was said, enable the police to appoint more skilled personnel 'in detective services, forensic sciences, crime intelligence, border control and the directorate for priority crime investigation'.²⁰

Table 2 is compiled from tables on 'Recruitment', 'Attrition' and other data on the total personnel strength of the SAPS contained in SAPS annual reports over the years since 2002. The figures are inconsistent. If the total for 'attrition' (35 426) is deducted from that for recruitment (123 606) the implied 'net increase' in SAPS personnel is 88 180 rather than the 79 000 increase reflected in the 'Total personnel' column. Whatever the explanation for this,²¹ the actual number of new personnel who have joined the SAPS since 2002 is over 114 000,²² suggesting that those who have joined since 2002 make up the bulk of current SAPS personnel.²³

THE RACIAL AND GENDER PROFILE OF NEW RECRUITS

As reflected in Table 1, the process of en masse recruitment has not only resulted in changes in the total personnel strength of the SAPS but also in its racial profile. Whilst black personnel made up roughly 75% of personnel in 2003, they now make up 88%.

Table 3 shows how the increase in black personnel has been distributed by race and gender. The total number of black personnel has increased by 77 649 with 'coloured' and Indian personnel making up only 8 339 (11%) of this number. The biggest increase during this period has been an increase of 37 203 in the number of African men. The change in the profile of the SAPS has also included a significant increase in the number of female personnel, with women accounting for 46% of the increase in black personnel. The bulk of this has been an almost three-fold increase (from 16 581²⁶ to 48 688) in the number of African women,²⁷ so that by March 2012 they accounted for almost 24,4% of all SAPS personnel. The number of black female employees has risen from 22 028 to 57 651.

Notwithstanding the scale of the recruitment process, the number of white employees has steadily declined during this period. From 2003 to 2012 the number of white males declined by 6 620 to 14 085, and white females by 3 253 to 9 565. The total number of female employees at the end of March 2012 was therefore 67 216. Whilst women accounted for just over 26% of personnel in 2003, they accounted for more than one third (33,7%) at the end of March 2012, comprising 25% police officers (38 637) and 68% civilian personnel (28 576).

The en masse recruitment process has therefore resulted in progressive changes in the racial

Table 2: Selected SAPS data on recruitment, attrition and total personnel, 2002-2012²⁴

Year end March 31	Recruitment	Attrition	Total personnel	Police officers ²⁵ (commissioned and non-commissioned)	% police officers
2002	-	-	120 549		
2003	14 594	4 215	131 483	102 737	78
2004	11 918	4 627	139 023	106 177	76
2005	12 682	4 453	148 970	115 595	78
2006	13 390	4 197	155 532	121 759	78
2007	11 237	3 164	163 416	129 869	79
2008	14 650	3 240	173 241	137 727	80
2009	14 611	3 310	182 754	145 172	79
2010	12 772	2 790	190 199	151 166	79
2011	8 202	2 671	193 892	154 750	80
2012	9 550	2 759	199 345	157 475	79
2012 (November)	-	-	-	156 489	
Total	123 606	35 426			

Table 3: Change in SAPS racial profile 1998 – 2012

	African	'Coloured'	Indian	Total	%
Male	37 203	4 623	200	42 026	54%
Female	32 107	3 287	229	35 623	46%
Total	69 310	7 910	429	77 649	100%
%	89,3	10,2	0,6	100	

profile of the SAPS. Table 4 shows how this has been done over the six-year period ending in March 2012 (April 2006 to March 2012), during which 71 012 personnel (including new recruits on contract) were recruited into the SAPS. Analysis of the data in this table indicates, amongst other things, that:

- Black recruits have accounted for 97,6% of the recruitment during this period. This indicates that there has been a shift in recruitment practice towards a more aggressive pursuit of representation targets. In the previous four-year period (April 2002 to March 2006) black recruitment accounted for 94% of recruits.²⁸
- Africans are the majority of recruits in all occupational bands. However, in the professional band they constitute 59% of recruits and in the skilled band 62%. White recruitment is 27% in the professional and 23% in the skilled band.
- In the lower job bands the picture is significantly different. Combining figures for the 'semi' and 'unskilled' bands, which account in total for 96,5% of new recruits, Africans account for 88%, 'coloureds' account for 9,2%, Indians account for 1,3% and whites account for 1,7% of all recruits.
- Effectively, therefore, 97,5% of African recruitment, 96,7% of 'coloured' recruitment and 92,8% of Asian recruitment lie in the bottom two bands. On the other hand, 66% of whites are recruited to these bands, and 34% to the professional and skilled bands.

The percentage of African recruits into the SAPS is therefore substantially higher than that of Africans in the population in general. 'Coloured' recruitment is also very marginally higher, while that of whites and Indians is lower. The implied justification for this was the necessity to establish

Table 4: Recruitment into the SAPS by race and band, 2006-2012

	% African	% 'Coloured'	% Indian	% White	% Total
Top management	0,003	0,000	0,000	0,001	4,004
Senior management	0,030	0,004	0	0,006	0,04
Professional	0,13	0,015	0,01	0,06	352
Skilled	2,07	0,29	0,19	0,77	134
Semi-skilled	17,2	2,0	0,6	0,9	36
Unskilled	67,5	6,9	0,7	0,7	101
Total	86,9	9,2	1,4	2,4	100

a representative SAPS. However, despite the significant changes that have taken place in the SAPS, whites, as well as 'coloureds' and Indians, may still be said to be over-represented (Table 5). From this point of view the SAPS still reflects the legacy of apartheid. If a strict alignment between overall population profiles and the profile of employees in public service organisations is a national objective, the process of changing the profile of the SAPS may still be incomplete.

The measures outlined above are justified when considering constitutional and legislative provisions that allow for steps to be taken to address the discriminatory legacy of apartheid. For instance, Section 9(2) of the Constitution says that '[t]o promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.'²⁹

Section 195(1)(i) emphasises questions of representation in relation to the public service, specifying that '[p]ublic administration must be

Table 5: Current racial profile of SAPS, SAPS recruitment and the South African population³⁰

	% African	% 'Coloured'	% Indian	% White	% Total
SAPS personnel 2012	75	11	2,7	12	100
SAPS recruitment 2006-2012	86,9	9,2	1,4	2,4	100
South African population	79,2	8,9	2,5	8,9	100

broadly representative of the South African people, with employment and personnel management practices based on ability, objectivity, fairness, and the need to redress the imbalances of the past to achieve broad representation.’ Legislative provisions such as the 1998 Employment Equity Act³¹ are also intended to contribute to the achievement of these ends. (It may be noted that certain aspects of the implementation by the SAPS of this framework have been the subject of litigation.³²)

IMPLICATIONS

The increase in the number of SAPS personnel over the last decade has required a substantial investment of public funds. For instance, the SAPS budget increased from R36,5 billion in 2007/08 to R53,5 billion in 2010/11, at an average annual rate of 13,6%, with the increase ‘driven mainly by increased expenditure in compensation of employees.’³³ Moreover, a public investment of this kind has long-term implications, as the payment of salaries and other benefits for those who have been recruited has to be sustained. The question arises: what has been achieved by this process?

Racial and gender justice

As a result of the changes in profile that have taken place in the last 17 years it seems likely that the SAPS may become ‘fully representative’ in terms of its overall racial profile within a relatively short period of time. How long this takes will depend on various factors, one of these being the level of recruitment. Since 2012 recruitment has slowed down dramatically. Treasury’s estimates of national expenditure indicate an intention to reduce the total number of SAPS personnel to 190 590 in 2012-13 and to 188 490 in 2014-15. This reduction in recruitment is said to be due to a ‘Cabinet-approved baseline cut.’³⁴ This means that some level of recruitment is likely to be sustained to offset personnel losses due to attrition, but recruitment will be at much lower levels than over the last ten years. As a result of these cuts, the number of police officers in the SAPS has already fallen from 157 475 in March 2012 to 155 729 in March 2013.³⁵

Rapid progress in achieving a more racially and gender representative SAPS, made possible by en masse recruitment, has important symbolic significance. It means that the SAPS no longer so overtly bears the imprint of the systematic exclusion and disadvantaging of black people that was a feature of apartheid.

By adding between 70 000 and 80 000 black employees to the total number of public sector employees in South Africa, en masse recruitment has also contributed in the region of 2,6% to the overall total of 2,83 million³⁶ employees in the public sector. Whether this was the intention or not, en masse recruitment has facilitated ‘rapid social mobility [in]to a black middle class.’³⁷ As Picard says, ‘[d]uring the 1930s and 1940s, the economic development of the Afrikaners had occurred through their mass recruitment into the public service. As a result, it was logical for Africans to think that a similar model of economic and social development should be open to them as well.’³⁸ However, it is an imperfect mechanism for doing so, as police salaries, particularly amongst the lower ranks, do not fully sustain what some regard as the requirements for middle class lifestyles. Despite their apparent good fortune, some police may therefore resort to illicit means to supplement their salaries.³⁹

Political non-partisanship?

A question that flows from the recognition that en masse recruitment has promoted black class formation is what the implications may be for the political alignment of the SAPS. The culture of the South African Police (SAP), as well as the homeland police forces, the institutional predecessors to the SAPS, was that of direct subordination to the wishes of their political masters. It is said that within the South African Police, the main predecessor to the SAPS, ‘the religious, political and ... scientific discourses of white rule in South Africa’ were ‘embedded in the police culture.’⁴⁰ This ensured that the SAP could be used as a ‘political instrument.’⁴¹ The dominance of Afrikaners within the SAP enabled the National Party to use the SAP to uphold apartheid (notwithstanding steady increases in the number of black personnel in the lower ranks of the SAP in the later apartheid period).⁴²

The requirement of Section 199(7) of the Constitution that the police act in a politically non-partisan manner is fundamental to free political activity and therefore to democracy. However, the experience of other African countries is that police tend to be supportive of the political status quo in part because 'ethnic alliances determine recruitment patterns', thereby making police 'more vulnerable to political pressure'.⁴³ Does the change in the racial profile of the SAPS enhance the risk of the SAPS being used for politically partisan ends?

An established feature of politics in South Africa is that political allegiances are associated with race. The African National Congress has successfully positioned itself as the party that embodies black, and particularly African, aspirations.⁴⁴ Many SAPS employees may therefore feel indebted to the ruling party, given that their employment is directly linked to government's en masse recruitment and employment equity policies. These feelings might potentially be exploited for partisan political activities.

There appears to be evidence of political partisanship among elements within the police. There are various reported cases where it is alleged that police have victimised the opponents of local or provincial political elites aligned with the leadership of the ruling party. In September 2009 members of the shack dwellers organisation *Abahlali baseMjondolo* were attacked in Kennedy Road in Durban. Rather than the attackers, it was the members of *Abahlali* who were arrested and prosecuted. The case was eventually thrown out of court in July 2011. In dismissing the charges the magistrate noted that the evidence that had been produced by the state was contradictory and gave rise to suspicion about the motives of the police.⁴⁵ Partisan policing may also be directed at internal opposition within the ANC and tripartite alliance.⁴⁶ Following violent protests in Wesselson in Mpumalanga in February 2011, police allegedly targeted members of the ANC opposed to the provincial leadership.⁴⁷ A number of instances of alleged partisan police intervention also occurred in the build-up to the ANC's 53rd National Conference in Mangaung in December 2012.⁴⁸

Lacklustre SAPS responses to the murder of corruption whistle blowers and other political killings also raise questions about whether it is acting in a genuinely non-partisan manner.⁴⁹

Nevertheless, in so far as these cases do reveal political partisanship on the part of the police, it is not clear that racial identity is a significant factor. In virtually all cases the alleged police partisanship is directed against black opponents of the SAPS.⁵⁰ In the one case where it has been suggested that identity may have played a role, the issue was ethnic rather than racial identity.⁵¹ Though issues relating to identity are not necessarily irrelevant, the factors that are at work here may have more to do with the general tendency of police towards antipathy to those who threaten the established order. This is manifested in some countries as a tendency for the police to support conservative political parties.⁵²

The established culture within the SAPS at this point may not be one that is strongly resistant to political manipulation of the police. In the initial post-1994 period, police training placed a strong emphasis on promoting respect for constitutional values among members of the SAPS. But it is not apparent that a culture that supports these values has become established within the SAPS. There is some evidence that the focus on constitutional values is no longer sustained in training. One press report indicated that training now involves 'assault, harsh punishment and sleep deprivation' with the aim of "toughening" them up and instilling discipline.⁵³ Training of this kind may well promote a mindset that is associated with blind obedience to authority.

On its own, the changed racial profile of the SAPS is unlikely to have a partisan effect. However, police can also be influenced by 'intimidation by politicians, intelligence organisations and their own senior officers'.⁵⁴ For instance, punitive treatment is used in Zimbabwe, where the power 'to suddenly transfer members of the police services to undesirable postings, uprooting them and their families from their social environment, has been identified by members of civil society and human rights activists as a powerful mechanism to ensure

the political compliance of members of the police service and the fostering of partisan policing.⁵⁵ This in turn enables the police to 'intimidate opponents of the ruling party as well as to suppress dissent'.⁵⁶

One of the risks for non-partisan policing in South Africa may be the use of promotions. In recent years there have been instances where individuals are rapidly promoted within the SAPS, ostensibly because they are likely to act in the interests of the ruling elite.⁵⁷ In some cases it has been demonstrated that this has involved direct and unlawful political interference.⁵⁸ Though done in the name of 'transformation', the individuals involved are allegedly not promoted because of race or gender, but for political reasons. Promotions of this kind do not only advance individuals who are politically partisan, but also convey the message that chances of promotion will be influenced by one's political allegiances.

Better policing?

The process of en masse recruitment took place against a backdrop of public anxiety about crime. In this environment it seems that government felt confident that the recruitment of more police would be accepted as being for the public benefit. Furthermore, the 'new' SAPS in all likelihood better reflects the language profile of South Africa, with the effect that SAPS members are probably able to communicate with people in their own languages. This is an important factor for service delivery. However, though there may be broader benefits, increases in police numbers on their own generally do not lead to a reduction in crime.⁵⁹ Improvements in crime-fighting strategies are more likely to have a positive impact on crime reduction. In addition, it appears that en masse recruitment is in fact likely to place police recruitment and training systems under strain, leading to a decline in policing standards.⁶⁰

SAPS annual reports and Treasury's annual 'Estimates of National Expenditure' do not indicate that attention was given to ensuring that the SAPS had the capacity to meet the demands that en masse recruitment would place on it. With the exception of a single remark on expanding

'e-learning' to meet the 'need to expand training capacity' in 2006,⁶¹ none of Treasury's estimates make any reference to whether adequate recruitment procedures are being followed, or whether sufficient training capacity is in place, despite the massive scale of the undertaking and its implications in terms of public finance. Massive recruitment is also likely to have exacerbated personnel management problems that have been acknowledged for some time.⁶²

But the issue is not merely that there are inherent risks in processes of en masse recruitment. This process of en masse recruitment took place in the highly charged post-apartheid employment environment, which has been associated with shortcomings in management and skills in many parts of the public sector. The imperative to address racial representation took priority over the development of an effective and capable public service.⁶³ Top officials were 'not judged according to whether their departments provide good public services but according to whether they [met] racial quotas in hiring or contracting'.⁶⁴ While government repeatedly emphasised the need for an efficient public service, this emphasis largely amounted to 'lip service'.⁶⁵ If priority is to be given to rapidly improving representation in such a manner as to support an efficient public service, this 'requires a significant human resource development and planning capacity'.⁶⁶ But 'South Africa did not follow strategically planned affirmative action policies, but rather an ad hoc policy of recruiting blacks and retiring whites'.⁶⁷

Concerns about the process of en masse recruitment finally received official acknowledgment when National Commissioner Bheki Cele told the Portfolio Committee on Police in September 2010 that the SAPS had sacrificed quality for quantity in the drive to increase its numbers. According to one press report,

Cele said the rush of new recruits, plus the common perception that the police were the last resort for those who failed at everything else, had lowered standards. "The South African police are recruited from the South African society and community. If we say what is the situation of

education in the Republic of South Africa ... You don't get the cream of what you complain about. You get the worst of that. "We've been a zama zama (try your luck) organization. We have not been big on quality, we have been big on quantity. People have been thrown in by chasing quantity rather than quality."⁶⁸

Not long after this, in December 2010, the SAPS announced steps to remedy the deficiencies in its recruitment and training process. It was announced that committees would be established to oversee recruitment, that the training period would once again be extended to two years, and that more vigorous vetting of applicants would be implemented.⁶⁹ It is possible, therefore, that new recruits admitted to the SAPS subsequent to 2010 are on average of a higher calibre, though how successful these measures have been is not clear. In early 2013, for instance, Deputy Minister of Police Maggie Sotyu described the recruitment process as besieged with 'favouritism, nepotism, allegiance and prejudice.'⁷⁰

Legitimacy

Police legitimacy in part requires that police represent a state authority that is itself legitimate. But it also implies that the presence and authority of the police themselves are accepted by members of the public, and is intimately linked to trust in the police.⁷¹ Where police are trusted, communities are more amenable to working with them. It is believed that the representativeness of police organisations is connected to public trust.⁷² Cooperation between police and communities, which is widely acknowledged to be a prerequisite for police effectiveness, is believed to be more likely where police agencies have a racial profile that reflects that of the community that they serve. However, the need for representation is not necessarily about people wanting to be served by an officer who shares their own racial or ethnic identity, though this has been shown to be a consideration for some people.⁷³ Legitimacy may have more to do with a sense of 'shared group membership',⁷⁴ where people feel that both they and the police form part of a common collective. 'Citizens must feel that it is "our" police force

defending the rights of "all of us", not "their" police force protecting the interest of "them".'⁷⁵

South African as a nation has been shaped by a history of conflict. In so far as a common collective identity may be said to exist amongst South Africans, this is only in a provisional sense. The process of transition to democracy has to some degree contributed to a common sense of identity, but has also been associated with some level of exclusion, not only by whites, who despite enjoying standards of living that are on average relatively high, now feel themselves to be politically disempowered, but by many blacks who feel that their inclusion in the South African polity has only been partial and that they are still disadvantaged by the legacy of apartheid.⁷⁶

The fact that close to 80% of South Africans are racially African raises questions about the type of racial profile that the SAPS needs to project in order to appeal to South Africans' sense of 'common identity', provisional as such identity may be. For instance, to what extent does it matter to African South Africans whether other groups are represented within the SAPS – or is it sufficient that they know that Africans are the predominant group within the organisation? Arguably, if the South African police service is to project itself as reflecting the common identity of South Africa, it needs to be able to project itself as an organisation that is 'both African and diverse'. As reflected in Table 6, notwithstanding the manner in which recruitment has been carried out, the number of whites at non-commissioned officer level within the SAPS remains at a level comparable to white representation in the overall population.

However, the way in which recruitment has taken place, and how it has been used to advance racial and gender representation, does not necessarily guarantee that the SAPS will be able to maintain a public profile of this kind.

For more than a decade whites as well as Indians have been significantly under-represented amongst the ranks of new recruits who undergo basic training, and who constitute much of the public

Table 6: Current race and gender profile of SAPS by rank of personnel, 2012

	African	'Coloured'	Indian	White	Total	Female
Top management ⁷⁷	25	3	1	3	32	9
%	78	9	3	9	100	28
Senior management ⁷⁸	427	72	43	179	721	222
%	59	10	6	25	100	31
Commissioned officers	16 247	2 437	1 260	6 342	26 286	8 041
%	62	9	5	24	100	31
Non-commissioned officers ⁷⁹	102 198	13 573	2 848	11 816	130 435	30 363
%	78	10	2	9	100	23
Public Service Act Employees ⁸⁰	30 277	5 143	1 141	5 309	41 870	28 579
%	72	12	3	13	100	68
Total	149 174	21 228	5293	23 649	199 340	67 216
%	75	11	3	12	100	34

face of the SAPS in various visible policing functions. This may mean that the public profile of the SAPS is of an almost exclusively black, and particularly African, police service. This is consistent with the fact that Africans in particular (79%) and blacks more generally (91%) constitute a large majority of the South African population. However, it may mean that the public face of the SAPS is not that of a police service that is representative of a racially diverse nation. Sustained under-representation of whites and Indians during the recruitment phase may also lead to a situation where the SAPS is not able to maintain a representative racial profile at the middle and upper levels of the organisation. For instance, white and Indian personnel are on average likely to be significantly older than black personnel. As older members leave the SAPS, it will increasingly come to reflect the profile of recruits during the post-1994 period. 'The present policies, which seek to correct imbalances in the overall composition of the SAPS very rapidly, may have negative consequences in terms of representation in the medium to long-term.'⁸¹

While it is widely believed that questions of representation contribute to trust in the police, it has been shown that police legitimacy is also strongly shaped by perceptions of the effectiveness of the police,⁸² as well as their procedural fairness.⁸³ Representation may

perhaps be a necessary condition for police legitimacy. But if gains in effectiveness are limited, or if the SAPS acts in a politically partisan or brutal manner, this may limit its potential to achieve legitimacy. As clearly illustrated by recent public outrage at acts of police brutality, representation on its own does not ensure police legitimacy.

CONCLUSION

The increase in the number of police personnel over the past ten years as a result of the process of en masse recruitment has profoundly transformed the SAPS. As a result of this process it is likely that a significant majority of SAPS members are now people who have joined the police since 1994. The use of this process to aggressively address questions of SAPS representation relative to the South African population, has enabled the SAPS to make considerable progress towards the constitutionally sanctioned goal of a police service that is 'broadly representative of the South African people'⁸⁴ as well as contributing to black class mobility.

The process raises other questions. Though it may not specifically enhance the chances of political partisanship, changes in the racial profile of the SAPS do not do away with the risk that a culture that supports politically partisan policing may persist within the SAPS. However, the key risks in this regard are likely to arise from other sources,

such as the promotion of politically favoured individuals. It is also suggested that the process of en masse recruitment has been associated with a lowering of vetting and training standards. Whilst many of the new recruits may become capable police officers, the SAPS may continue to be characterised by the unevenness of its performance. Finally, changes in representation may improve the SAPS's legitimacy amongst the majority of South Africans but there are likely to be limitations to public respect for the service in so far as it is regarded as ineffective, partisan or abusive.

This major injection of 'new blood' suggests that there may be new possibilities for policing in South Africa. However, such potential may not be realised unless police receive the appropriate leadership.⁸⁵ This suggests that the proposals contained in the National Development Plan for the SAPS National Commissioner and other senior leaders to be appointed by the president on the basis of the recommendations of a selection panel⁸⁶ are worthy of consideration, as are proposals for a national police board to set minimum standards for recruitment and promotion.⁸⁷



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<http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php>

NOTES

1. The terms African, coloured, Indian, and white are used here as used in SAPS reports. The term 'African' is used as a racial term and is not intended to imply that 'coloureds', Indians or whites do not also have a right to claim the term 'African' as an identity.
2. Efforts to address questions of representation within the SAPS are also discussed in other publications, including Moses Montesh, Transformation in the South African Police Service: the implementation of affirmative action and employment equity in SAPS, *South African Journal of Criminal Justice*, 23 (1) (2010).
3. Due to uncertainties about the reliability of crime statistics as well as a lack of clarity in relation to more general questions about the relationship between policing and crime trends this article does not attempt to answer questions about the impact of en masse recruitment on crime.
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6. *Ibid.*, 23.
7. Author's calculation based on figures in David Bruce, Gareth Newham and Themba Masuku, *In service of the people's democracy – an assessment of the South African Police Service*, Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation & Open Society Foundation for South Africa, 2007, 154, Table 22 <http://www.csvr.org.za/wits/papers/papsaps.htm> (accessed 21 March 2013).
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12. Telephonic interviews: Janine Rauch, Antony Altbeker, 31 January 2013.
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21. If this discrepancy is not related to irregularities in reporting by the SAPS it may be explained if the number of new recruits (123 606) includes all new recruits, most of whom are first admitted to the SAPS on contract and only admitted as 'permanent' members if they complete basic training successfully. If they do not pass basic training they are not admitted as full time personnel into the SAPS. This group (of those who do not pass basic training) is included in at least some of the recruitment figures but possibly not reflected in statistics on attrition.
22. Calculated by adding the total increase in personnel (79 000) to the figure for attrition (35 426).
23. Though some new recruits may be amongst the 35 426 who have left during this period.
24. The table is compiled from data in SAPS Annual Reports, 2002 to 2012
25. As opposed to 'civilians'.
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29. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Section 9(2).
30. SAPS personnel and recruitment figures are based on author's calculations from figures provided in SAPS annual reports. Population figures are from Statistics South Africa, 2012, 21.
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