In many respects 2009 has been a difficult year for South Africans as far as service delivery protest marches, wage strikes and other events are concerned. These incidents have managed to cause chaos in some parts of the country, yet, ironically have served at the same time to demonstrate South Africa’s readiness for the 2010 FIFA World Cup (FWC). Throughout, South Africans have been focused on one goal – to host a successful FWC in 2010. Key to a successful FWC will be the ability of the police and other law enforcement agencies to ensure the security of the event. Since the 2004 announcement that South Africa would be hosting the FWC, the South African Police Service (SAPS) has been actively preparing for the event. However, organisational restructuring, combating crime, training, as well as dealing with the protests, strikes and xenophobic violence that emerge from time to time has given the SAPS more than enough to cope with.

**PROTESTS AND STRIKES**

The country experienced a wave of service delivery protests and wage strikes during the first half of this year. By end July, twenty-four major protests were recorded. Of these, 24 per cent took place in Gauteng, 16 per cent in North West, Mpumalanga and Western Cape, and 12 per cent in Limpopo. The unrest incidents in the other provinces range in the region of four to eight per cent. Experts predict that protest actions in 2009 are likely to escalate beyond those of 2007 and 2008.

While most protest actions have been related to service delivery and wage issues, several of the protests have taken on strong xenophobic

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**Can practice make perfect?**

**Security and the 2010 FIFA World Cup**

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The security of major events such as the FIFA Confederations Cup (FCC) in 2009 and the FIFA World Cup (FWC) in 2010 is crucial to their success. This article explores South Africa’s readiness for the FWC from a security perspective, and considers the security machinery responsible for the planning of the operation and its eventual implementation. It also provides a synopsis of other security operations during 2009, such as the general elections, the Indian Premier League Cricket tournament and the British and Irish Lions rugby tour, and the lessons learnt from these. In addition, policing the wave of service delivery protests and strikes during the first half of 2009 added valuable lessons, especially in relation to crowd management. Finally, the article considers some of the real and potential security threats for the FWC and concludes that, in spite of a few remaining concerns, South Africa has the will and capacity to provide high quality security for one of the world’s biggest sporting events.
overtones, raising the spectre of a resurgence of last year’s crisis. Most concerning in relation to these incidents is the high level of violence and damage to property associated with the protests. The Gauteng Provincial Government has also accused criminal elements of ‘hijacking’ and ‘fuelling’ protests in Gauteng. Government leaders have been quick to condemn the violence and warned perpetrators that the police will act against them. President Zuma recently stated:

> Our Constitution allows our people to exercise the right of freedom of assembly and expression, and to protest where they feel they need to, but this must be done within the ambit of the law.

In many instances the police did resort to using rubber bullets to disperse crowds. Police action in these instances was labelled as ‘aggressive’ by the general public and some media and was even compared to that of the riot police during the 80s and early 90s. According to SAPS procedures, the use of rubber bullets should be a last resort. Negotiations between the police and protestors are a prescribed first measure and should be exercised before any hard action is taken. While it may be that the hard line taken by the police is a response to messages from political leaders that encourage the police to act against criminals, it is more likely that it is a consequence of restructuring within the SAPS that negatively impacted on performance, particularly that of the Public Order Police (POP) units.

In 2006 the POP units underwent an organisational restructuring that reduced their capacity. Prior to the restructuring process, there were 7 227 POP members nationally in 43 units. After the restructuring, there were only 2 595 POP members and 23 units. The xenophobic attacks in 2008 prompted the SAPS to increase their crowd management capacity once again as the shortage of POP members during the xenophobic incidents was strongly highlighted. Currently there are 3 306 POP members in 27 units. By the end of December 2009 there are expected to be 5 661 POP members and 29 units (see the following table for information on capacity).

### Table 1: SAPS national public order capacity before and after restructuring

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>POP before restructuring in 2006</th>
<th>POP after restructuring in 2006</th>
<th>Increase after 2008: current POP capacity</th>
<th>Expected POP capacity by end Dec 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No of members</td>
<td>7 227</td>
<td>2 595</td>
<td>3 306</td>
<td>5 661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of units</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
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</table>

During 2009 the depleted units had to deal with huge demands on their services. Police station members and Metro Police officers, who are equipped with only level-one training in crowd management (POP members have the requisite level-three training) have not been able to provide sufficient support and assistance. In addition, station commissioners have been reluctant to release station members to perform crowd management duties, due to other station priorities.

In-service training, a routine continuous training requirement for members trained in crowd management, is also never systematically undertaken by station members. This raises doubts about their ability to deal with situations they may face.

**NATIONAL ELECTIONS AND SPORTING EVENTS**

**National elections**

Policing the South African general elections in 2009 was given high priority status by the SAPS, due to the high level of political tension in the country, and the resurgence of political violence. The increased tension and violence was a consequence of several factors:

- Tensions between the Mbeki/Zuma factions before and after the ANC’s Polokwane Conference in December 2008 and the concomitant ousting of Mbeki as the ANC and South African president
- The establishment of COPE, a splinter of the ANC
Indian Premier League

To exacerbate the situation, the Indian Premier League (IPL) cricket tournament, that had not been on the police's agenda for this period, also had to be policed. The SAPS was not consulted or informed of the event and became aware of the event via media reports, despite the fact that the SAPS would be primarily responsible for security. Fortunately the IPL cricket tour remained violence free, but police still had to be deployed to the event. Although the elections were largely peacefully concluded, the police recorded a number of incidents of political intolerance and criminal offences. Twenty-eight incidents were recorded on the day preceding the elections, and 85 incidents were recorded on election day.

Lions tour

The British and Irish Lions tour was well planned and organisation started months before the event. The South African government, the SAPS and the South African Rugby Union, in conjunction with the Irish and British embassies, were all involved. The major unplanned-for challenge was the logistics regarding venues that almost clashed with that of the FIFA Confederations Cup. Despite this, there were no major security challenges during the Lions Tour.

THE CONFEDERATIONS CUP EXPERIENCE

The FIFA Confederations Cup (FCC) ended on a high note on 28 June, bringing to a close a two-week event presented in four stadiums in three provinces. In his first budget vote speech in Parliament on 1 July 2009 the new Deputy Minister of Police, Fikile Mbalula, made the following remark in relation to the security of this event:

We dare declare … that the Confederations Cup was a resounding success held in a safe and secure environment, with no major crime incidents directly related to the tournament reported.
FIFA President Sepp Blatter gave South Africa 7.5 out of 10. While the two and a half points lost were ascribed to concerns about transport and accommodation, Blatter did express a concern about crowd management outside the stadium. There can be little doubt that to FIFA, and many others, the FCC was a test, a dry run, for the ‘real thing’, i.e. the FIFA Soccer World Cup (FWC) in 2010. Since this article is primarily concerned with the security of the FWC, it is necessary to consider the outcome of this ‘test’ by looking at the FCC security operations, lessons learnt and the security prospects for 2010.

Security operations

At a press conference in Pretoria on 29 June 2009 the National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (NATJOINTS) provided a briefing on the security operations for the FCC. According to the NATJOINTS press release the ‘overall concept of operations’ applied during the FCC is based on the operational concept developed for the FWC. This concept requires a comprehensive integrated approach between the NATJOINTS, responsible for national security (including crime combating and law enforcement operations) and the FIFA Local Organising Committee (LOC), responsible for event-specific security with the aid of private security companies.

At the media briefing on the success of the FCC it was reported that security operations included seeing to the safety of players, officials and fans in and around the stadiums on both match and non-match days. The incidence of all crimes within a radius of one kilometre of the four stadiums, practice venues and FIFA hotels was monitored and analysed on a twenty-four hour basis for purposes of targeted deployment of the security services (SAPS, Metro Police and private security).

The security services also provided close protection units for the participating teams at all times, as well as for identified FIFA dignitaries. They deployed between 6 000 and 8 000 members for security operations in host cities, with specialised high-risk forces comprising members of the SAPS Special Task Force and the SANDF Special Forces on standby for emergency situations. Five hundred and fifty railway police members were deployed on special trains that transported fans to and from stadiums. Due to late applications by, and contracts for, some private security companies, the police were obliged to provide an additional 750 members for inner-perimeter security at Loftus Versfeld, Ellis Park and the Royal Bafokeng stadium. According to the NATJOINTS the special detective teams that were appointed for all FCC related crimes and the dedicated courts that were established for the same purpose worked particularly well and will be duplicated during the FWC.

Impact of the security operations

The NATJOINTS claim that the targeted security operations (high density policing) during the two weeks of the FCC led to a ‘dramatic’ decrease in crimes such as murder, attempted murder, aggravated robbery, car theft and sexual assaults in the areas surrounding the stadiums, compared to the same period in 2008. This is in spite of the fact that almost 600 000 people attended the sixteen matches. According to the NATJOINTS, 39 cases of criminal conduct that could be linked to the stadiums, the immediate vicinity of the stadiums and the hotels hosting the teams, were reported. Most of these were theft cases, in particular of cell phones; five were robberies (muggings); one was for reckless driving; two were for corruption; one was for assault; and one was for the use of counterfeit money. This amounts to one crime per ten thousand spectators. The police arrested 25 suspects in connection with these crimes. In addition, as a result of the police’s targeted crime combating operations in the vicinity (outer perimeter) of the designated areas (stadiums, hotels, practice venues, etc), they also arrested about 2 000 suspects for crimes unrelated to the FCC.

LESSONS LEARNT

The series of events and incidents in and before 2009 has in many ways prepared South Africa for next year’s FWC. The challenge now lies in how these lessons are adopted and implemented.
**FIFA Confederations Cup lessons**

- The current approach to integrate and coordinate the work of various government departments through the JOINTS (Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure) system is working well and provides a firm tried and tested platform for the security of the FWC.
- The joint exercises organised by the NATJOINTS before events such as the FCC and the FWC, to identify what works and what doesn’t, were successful, but it also showed that more of these exercises, as well as more interdepartmental training, are needed.
- The late applications by and deployment of private security firms highlighted the deficiencies in relation to the current tender and contracting system of the LOC, and the need to address these. In this regard the Minister of Police also appointed a PSIRA (Private Security Regulatory Authority) task team to investigate the actions of the LOC and certain private security companies against the requirements of the PSIRA Act (Act 56 of 2001).
- It is important to develop guidelines that provide role clarification between the various branches of the security establishment, in particular between the SAPS, Metro Police Services and private security companies.
- There is a need to review the existing guidelines for security at Public Viewing Areas (Fan Parks).
- The resources of the Disaster Management structures at local level need urgent attention.
- Despite the division of responsibilities between security role players the SAPS remains overall responsible for security and should therefore always maintain a reserve that could fill any gap created by the non-performance of any of the other role players.

**Other lessons**

- Heavy police presence in hotspots during the elections no doubt made a difference in deterring would-be transgressors. Intensive planning and improved crime analysis, as well as closer cooperation with other SAPS divisions prior to the elections aided in the success of the elections.
- South African government and non-government agencies must coordinate events to avoid unexpected surprises and overlap of events for the security agencies, such as those that occurred with the IPL cricket tournament and the elections, as well as the FCC tournament and the Lions Rugby Tour.
- Service delivery protests and wage strikes will most probably be repeated next year because of the bargaining opportunities for protesters and strikers created by South Africa’s desire to present a successful FWC. Government needs to be prepared to deal with a recurrence of these actions on a much larger scale. The SAPS too have to be prepared.
- Given the violent intensity of the protests in 2009 and the continuing high levels of discontent, the likelihood that the same behaviour will be repeated next year is strong.
- Wage protests generally occur between April and July each year. This means that protests and wage strikes will in all probability coincide with the FIFA World Cup in June. Government has to take cognisance of this to avoid disruptions and embarrassment in 2010.
- The likelihood that xenophobic attacks will recur is strong. Plans to address this have to be in place (see the article by Monson and Misago in this edition of SACQ).
- It is not in the public interest to arrest violent protestors and release them without some sort of penalty.

**SECURITY PROSPECTS FOR THE 2010 FWC**

On the basis of our experience with the security of big events in 2009 (and before), and an analysis of our security situation in general, as well as the NATJOINTS planning for the FWC, it is possible to identify some of the real and potential threats that the security services may be faced with in 2010. In response to these an indication will be given of the extent of the security machinery responsible for this event.
Security threats

Crime is all about precipitating (opportunity) and predisposing (inclination) factors coming together at the same time. In this regard the FWC will be an ideal facilitator for crime, keeping in mind that in addition to local South Africans who will attend FWC matches in large numbers, another estimated 450 000 international visitors are expected. No doubt the vast majority of these will be here for one of the greatest sporting events on earth, but there will be those, locals and visitors, for whom this event is just an extremely attractive opportunity to enrich themselves through illegal means.

Of course there always is the danger of crimes that are motivated by reasons other than greed, such as terrorism. South Africa does not presently face any direct threat of terrorism, but with the diversity of countries that will participate in the FWC, some representing opposing political and religious beliefs, this country will have to plan and prepare for such a contingency.

In general, however, the security threats in relation to the FWC will come from opportunistic and organised criminals. In many ways, although South Africa still experiences extraordinary high levels of crime, especially violent crime, the country has made some positive strides towards decreasing its crime levels. For example, our overall crime rate has decreased over the last four years by more than 24 per cent, and our murder rate has come down on a consistent basis since 1994 by more than 40 per cent (although it remains more than seven times that of the United States). We also know that approximately 80 per cent of murders happen between people who know each other, in other words, in a particular context that poses no direct threat to strangers.

The violent crimes that continue to plague this country and negatively impact on the general and personal perceptions of safety are the so-called Trio Crimes (house robbery, business robbery and car hijackings), as sub-categories of aggravated robbery. House robberies have been on the increase since this crime type was first monitored in 2002/03, from 9 063 to 14 481 in 2007/08. Business robbery started to increase between 2004/05 and 2007/8, from 3 320 to 9 862; and car hijackings increased from 12 434 in 2004/05 to 14 201 in 2007/08. However, street robbery (muggings) still constitutes about 66 per cent of all aggravated robberies and should be regarded as potentially the biggest crime threat that visitors to the FWC may encounter in 2010.

Other security threats include the activities of organised crime syndicates who may target the FWC in terms of cyber crime, drugs, and crimes related to the sex industry. In the latter case it is particularly human trafficking, aimed at the sexual exploitation of women and children, that poses a concern.

Finally, although not directly criminal, there should be concern that the successful hosting of the FWC might be exploited by unions and other dissatisfied groups to hold government (and other employers) ransom through their demands.

Security machinery for the FWC

The security machinery for major events such as the FWC is fairly sophisticated and to the uninformed extremely complicated. In essence, however, it comprises the JOINTS (NATJOINTS at national level, with provincial JOINTS (PROVJOINTS) and local JOINTS (LOCJOINTS). A JOINTS Planning Team for the security planning of every major event is established under the direct control of the SAPS Deputy National Commissioner for Operational Services. In the case of the FWC the Security Directorate of the FIFA Local Organising Committee (LOC) is expected to work closely with the above committees and later also with the operational committees. As indicated above, the Security Directorate is responsible for event security and the JOINTS for national security. Joint planning therefore is aimed at the integration of their plans and to clarify their roles.

Immediately prior to the start of the event the Planning Team is replaced by a Joint Operations Committee (JOCOM), which directs the
operation through a network of Joint Operation Centres (JOCs) and Venue Operation Centres (VOCs). The key responsibility for all of the above is the effective coordination and cooperation between all role players. In addition, these structures must ensure that the operation runs according to plan and that all contingencies are effectively dealt with.

The bulk of the resources (human and material) for the FWC security operation comes from the SAPS, with additional resources deployed by the Metro Police Services, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), the intelligence community, Disaster Management and others (e.g. special dedicated courts set up by the Department of Justice). It is estimated that approximately 50 000 members of the security services, excluding private security, will be deployed to protect the FWC. Of the latter number 41 000 will be members of the SAPS. In this regard the personnel expansion of the SAPS over the last eight years, from approximately 120 000 in 2000/01 to 183 000 in 2009, will enable the SAPS to deploy sufficient force levels, hopefully without neglecting policing in general. The approved target for the SAPS in 2010 is 193 000. In addition to having more personnel the SAPS already have or are in the process of procuring additional and sophisticated equipment that will enhance their operational capability during 2010 and beyond. These include mobile command centres, mobile water cannons, helicopters, bomb squad equipment, satellite imaging systems, etc.

All of the above resources are to be deployed as part of an extremely comprehensive operational plan that provides, inter alia, for crime prevention and combating operations, VIP protection, border security (including air- and seaports), borderline security (including air and sea security), transport and route security, tourism security and contingency planning for specific security threats.

CONCLUSION

There is little doubt that in spite of South Africa’s relatively high crime levels, the state has the will and the capacity to provide high quality security for the World Cup. The security plan is comprehensive and adequately resourced, and with the experience accumulated and lessons learnt over the last number of years, in particular with the recent events in 2009, the security services should be able to further hone their plan.

However, there are a few remaining concerns. Despite a SAPS personnel increase of more than 60 000 over the last eight years, key units such as the Public Order Police units were restructured to under half their original personnel strength, ostensibly to strengthen police stations. Given the crucial role of these units for the policing of major events such as the FWC, and for crowd management in general, their current under-resourcing is illogical and poses a critical risk should the SAPS be required to deploy adequate numbers of well-trained and equipped members for crowd management during 2010. It is important to re-establish these units to their former strength (and perhaps further improve on their capacity and equipment). A re-visit of the procedures of the Regulations of Gatherings Act is also advised.

The continuing high levels of violent crime such as street robbery and other forms of aggravated robbery, if not addressed, may become a source of national embarrassment in 2010 and may even deter potential visitors from coming to South Africa.

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NOTES

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
6 Zuma tells protestors state will enforce the law, Business Day, 24 July 2009.
7 B Omar personal interview with senior SAPS officer, 10 June 2009, Pretoria.
8 Mail & Guardian, 1 April 2009, Johannesburg.
SAPS KwaZulu-Natal Operational Response Service provided the numbers.

B Omar personal interview with senior SAPS officer, 10 June 2009, Pretoria.

B Omar personal interview with senior SAPS officer, 14 May 2009, Pretoria.


B Omar personal interview with senior SAPS officer, personal interview, 11 August 2009, Pretoria.


Ibid.

The NATJOINTS is the security coordinating arm of both the National Security Council (NSC), and the Justice Crime Prevention and Security Cluster (JCPS) representative of fourteen government departments. However, the nature of the task, operation or emergency normally determines the composition of the NATJOINTS. The department with the primary responsibility also provides the chairperson (at the level of Deputy Director General) for the duration of the task, operation or emergency. For example, the South African Police Service (SAPS) will chair the NATJOINTS during all crime combating and security operations with support from other key departments such as Intelligence, Justice (including the National Prosecuting Authority), the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), the National Disaster Management Centre and the various Metro Police Services.

NATJOINTS (National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure) 2009, Security operations for the FIFA Confederations Cup, Media statement, 29 June.


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Ibid; J Burger telephonic interview with B Groenewald, Assistant Commissioner, SAPS, 7 August 2009.

NATJOINTS, Media statement, 29 June 2009.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


The lessons learnt from the FCC are based largely on comments by B Groenewald, Telephonic interview.

7 August 2009.

Ibid; J Burger telephonic discussion with a representative of the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority who prefers to remain anonymous.


Ibid, 7. At the time of writing the figures for 2008/09 were not yet released.

Ibid, 11.


Ibid.

Ibid.

This is the Act that governs the policing of gatherings.