Considering the Glenister judgment: Independence requirements for anti-corruption institutions
This article analyses the majority and minority positions in the Constitutional Courtâ€™s Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others decision. It will identify the main differences in approach to the issue of the political â€˜independenceâ€™ of an investigative agency such as the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (the Hawks), and its predecessor, the Directorate of Special Operations (Scorpions). The article assesses what â€˜room for manoeuvreâ€™ in terms of possible legislation the majority judgment leaves to the South African parliament. The Courtâ€™s approach and these apparent requirements are compared with current provisions for political â€˜independenceâ€™ of anti-corruption agencies in Australia and Indonesia, raising, in particular, an assessment of the arguments for and against (a) the need for an anti-corruption investigative agency to be separate from the â€˜regularâ€™ police and prosecution service; and (b) the proposition that an anti-corruption investigative agency requires a higher level of political independence than the â€˜regularâ€™ police service(s). It also looks at issues of cost and effectiveness in establishing and maintaining dedicated independent anti-corruption agencies.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
SACQ is licenced under a creative commons licence (CC BY) that allows others to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon your work, even commercially, as long a they give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. They may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use.
Copyright for articles published is vested equally between the author/s, the Institute for Security Studies and the Centre of Criminology (UCT).